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Evaluation criteria for school admissions do not account for the impact of implicit bias on applications,
due to e.g., socioeconomic status of students or training resources available to them. We present, to the
best of our knowledge, the first mathematical analysis of the impact of biased evaluations of students on
school admissions. In our model, students have a unanimous ranking of schools, schools observe “biased”
potentials for a group of students and true potentials for others, and then accept the best students from
those available to them. Our framework for evaluating the effects of bias and of targeted intervention can
incorporate any distribution of students’ potentials and deals with the following questions: how much are
students and schools affected by such bias; do schools have an incentive to interview students; how should
limited resources be allocated to minimize the “impact” of bias on students. When students’ potentials
are Pareto distributed, we find that schools have little incentive to change their evaluation mechanisms.
Moreover, additional resources are best targeted at average students, as opposed to top students, thus
questioning existing scholarship mechanisms. This optimal target range shifts towards top students, when
students’ potentials are Gaussian distributed. We validate these findings using SAT scores data from New
York City high schools. Our conclusions are robust, as qualitative takeaways from our analysis remain the
same even when some of our modeling assumptions are relaxed.
Key words : bias, school matchings, disparate impact, interventions, vouchers, community, demographic,
mistreatment, fairness
1. Introduction
In 1995, Steele and Aronson (1995) conducted multiple experiments to show that when students
perceive frustration while doing a test (i.e., when they feel that the level of questions is beyond
their competence), and if there exists a negative group-stereotype that they are aware of, then
their performance is significantly undermined. This led them to hypothesize that stereotype-threat
can cause African American students to score lower on tests. Such studies are not unique to race-
based groups, but have also been conducted to show the impact of stereotype-threat in groups
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2with low socioeconomic status (Lovaglia et al. 1998) and for women in Mathematics (Schmader
2002). Besides performances on tests, even when candidates from different groups look identical
on paper, recent studies have found that there is a significant disparity in the perception of these
candidates by the evaluators, which is manifested in differences in the number of offers and in
salaries (Moss-Racusin et al. 2012).
Bias and the disparity in opportunities are also believed to play a major role in the access
to education at different levels (Quinn Capers et al. 2017). For instance, minorities often tend
to cluster in middle and high schools of lower quality (Boschma and Brownstein 2016) and are
underrepresented in higher education programs (Ashkenas et al. 2017). Our goal in this work
is to consider a model of school admission that takes bias into consideration, and investigate
mathematically justified policies to mitigate the effect of bias.
The most common way to model admission to schools is through a two-sided market, with the
two sides being schools and students, respectively, and each agent having an ordered preference
on the agents from the other side of the market that are considered acceptable. This model has
been used to match doctors to hospitals by the National Residency Matching Program since 1960s.
And it has gained widespread notoriety when Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2005) reformed the admission
process for New York City public high schools in 2003. New York City has a very extensive public
school system, in which over a million students are currently enrolled. In particular, every year
roughly 80,000 students wish to join one of the 700 high school programs. Since 2003, admission
is centralized and has been (essentially) governed by the classical Gale–Shapley / Deferred Accep-
tance algorithm (Gale and Shapley 1962). The simplicity of the algorithm, as well as the drastic
improvement over the quality of the matches it provides when compared to the pre-2003 method,
led to academic and public acclaim, and spurred applications in many other systems (see, e.g., Biro´
(2008)). However, this mechanism does not naturally address problems like school segregation and
class diversity, which have worsened and become more and more of a concern in recent years (Kuc-
sera and Orfield 2014, Shapiro March 26, 2019, Shapiro and Lai June 03, 2019). The scientific
community has reacted by incorporating in the mathematical model group-specific quotas and
proportionality constraints (Biro´ et al. 2010, Nguyen and Vohra 2019, Tomoeda 2018), but there
is evidence that adding such constraints may sometimes even hurt minorities they were meant to
help (Hafalir et al. 2013).
In this work, we take a different route, introducing a novel mathematical model aimed at quan-
tifying the effect of bias in a simple two-sided matching market, and proposing interventions with
limited resources to mitigate this effect. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first approach in
the literature that analyzes the impact of bias in school admissions. While one can see a natural
application to the school assignment problem, our framework more generally models a two-sided
3market where a candidate may not be perceived at his/her true potential, and is therefore assigned
to a lower level than the one (s)he deserves. We summarize our model and contributions next.
1.1. The model
We give here a high-level view of our model, and defer the details and a comparison with models
from the literature to Section 2. We assume that both sides of the market (to which we refer as
schools and students henceforth) form continuous sets. Every student is assigned a real number,
to which we refer as the (true) potential of the student. The schools are however only aware of
a different number, to which we refer as the perceived potential. We assume the population of
students is divided into two sets, G1 and G2. For a student from G1, his/her potential and perceived
potential coincide, while for a student from G2, his/her perceived potential equals to the potential
multiplied by a constant β ∈ (0,1]. Students from G2 form a p fraction of the total population,
with p ∈ [0,1]. As we alluded to in the introduction, there could be multiple causes why this bias
is perceived: the scholastic career of the student, their attitude, their prior access to high-quality
education, the tools schools use to evaluate them, etc.
Schools then rank students based on students’ perceived potentials. Hence, all schools share
the same ranking of students. One possible interpretation for the perceived potentials is students’
standardized test score. For instance, New York City’s top 8 public schools select candidates solely
based on their scores in the Specialized High School Admissions Test (SHSAT) (New York City
Department of Education NYC DOE). These scores are known to be impacted by socioeconomic
status of students (Lovaglia et al. 1998), or test preparation received in middle school (Corcoran
and Baker-Smith 2018, Shapiro February 06, 2019). It is shown that around 50% (resp. 80%) of the
students admitted to the top public high schools in New York City come from only 5% (resp. 15%)
of the middle schools (Corcoran and Baker-Smith 2018). Similarly to top high schools in NYC,
universities in China and India rank students in an unanimous order according to their test scores
in the college-entrance exam (Wikipedia contributors 2019).
We also assume that there is a unique, strict ranking of schools, that every student agrees on.
This could be interpreted as one of the many available ranking of schools, or as a shared perception
of which schools are the best. Although this assumption abstracts out many considerations that
may be important for students (e.g. proximity of a school (Burgess et al. 2015) or constraints on
the size of preference lists (Calsamiglia et al. 2010)), it is known that rankings have a huge impact
on the colleges that students select. For instance, Luca and Smith (2013) observe that the U.S.
News ranking of colleges has become so influential because it “makes the information so simple
... U.S. News did the work of aggregating the information into an easy-to-use ranking ... students
tend to ignore the underlying details even though these details carry more information than the
4Summary of analysis Section
Q1. Quantify for students the difference in matched school rankings with/without bias. 3.1
Q2. Quantify for schools the difference in utility with/without bias. 3.2
Q3. Can and should schools interview to improve their utility? 4.1
Q4. How to target resources to minimize the impact of bias on students? 4.2
Q5. Can our analysis be applied to real-world data? 5 & 6.2
Q6. Robustness of our quantitative results with perturbation on our assumptions. 6.1
Table 1 Summary of our contributions.
overall rank.” As another example, it is currently largely acknowledged that, among top public
scientific high schools in New York City, Stuyvesant is the most selective and demanded, followed
by Bronx Science and Brooklyn Tech (Corcoran and Baker-Smith 2018).
Because of the structure of our model, most classical concepts of efficiency and fairness1 are
satisfied by the matching where students are admitted to schools in order of their potentials,
while we assume that in the biased setting, students are matched according to their perceived
potentials (see Section 2 for formal definitions). This paper is devoted to understand how different
those two matchings are (in terms of a variety of measures) and what interventions can be put in
place to reduce this difference through the reduction of bias. We interpret such interventions (e.g.,
conducting interviews, providing additional training, building communities for students) as costly
activities that can reveal the potential for certain students.
Assumptions on the potentials of students. We consider two different choices on the distri-
bution of students’ potentials. First, following the recent work on bias by Kleinberg and Raghavan
(2018), we assume that the potentials of students are distributed following a Pareto (power law)
distribution with support [1,∞). There has been much empirical work (see, e.g., Clauset et al.
(2009)) supporting the statement that the achievement of individuals in many professions can be
well approximated using such distributions with a small, positive power-law exponent, denoted in
the following by α. Second, we assume that the potentials of students are distributed as a Gaussian
distribution. This is motivated by the fact that the scores of many tests, for instance SAT, follow
the Gaussian distribution Taube and Linden (1989). As already discussed, standardized tests play
a major role in school admission.
1.2. Summary of Contributions
We next present our investigative framework and questions aimed at quantifying the impact of bias
on school admissions and finding the most impactful venues for targeted interventions. Questions
1 One could actually formally define e.g. stability in our double-continuous model following ideas similar to those
in Azevedo and Leshno (2016), and then take the proportion of blocking pairs as a measure of unfairness. We postpone
this analysis to a later work.
5Q1-Q4 give a quantitative and qualitative measure of the impact of bias and the outcomes of
interventions when students’ potentials follow Pareto distribution. We will mostly assume p to
be small (i.e., p ≈ .25). Question Q5 summarizes the results when the distribution changes to
Gaussian. Finally, in questions Q6, we discuss how our qualitative takeaways remain the same
under various relaxations of our modeling assumptions. See Table 1 for an outline.
Q1. How costly is bias for students? Can a student be placed in a school much worse than the one
(s)he deserves, because of bias?
We formally investigate this question in Section 3.1. We observe that all G2 students are assigned
to schools that are worse than what they actually deserve, with some G2 students being assigned to
significantly lower ranked schools. Quantitatively, as students’ potentials decrease, such discrepancy
increases initially and then drops to 0. Thus, presence of bias impacts the average students the
most – where they are pushed to significantly lower ranked schools. Let us call, for any student,
the difference between the rank of the matched school in the biased setting and the rank of the
matched school in the unbiased setting (when schools observe the true potentials) by the term
displacement. We characterize the displacement of students in G1 and G2 and show that:
Proposition 1. (informal) The maximum displacement of (1− p)(1− βα) is experienced by
a G2 student with potential 1/β. In contrast, the displacement of any G1 student is negative, i.e.,
they are always assigned to better schools in the biased setting. The most negative displacement
−p(1−βα) is experienced by the G1 student with potential 1.
In other words, the maximum displacement (for G2 students) is worse when the proportion of
G2 students, p, is small and when the bias that G2 students experience is large (i.e., β is small).
We next ask the same question from the perspective of schools.
Q2. How costly is bias for schools? Would the utility of schools – that we define to be the average
potential of assigned students – be much lower when G2 students are perceived with lower potentials?
In addition, how does the presence of bias affect diversity at schools?
We give a formal answer to the first two questions in Section 3.2. Qualitatively, we show that,
in contrast to the negative impact of bias on the school matches of G2 students, the impact on the
utilities of schools is negligible for all schools other than the lowest ranked schools. This is because
for each school, although the average potential of assigned G1 students is lower than it should be,
its assigned G2 students have much higher true potentials. And thus, the toll on the utility due
to unqualified G1 students is partially canceled out by the overqualified G2 students and the net
effect is minimal. On the other hand, some lower ranked schools that only admit G2 students fare
better in the biased setting (since they admit over-qualified G2 candidates).
6Proposition 2. (informal) Let s∈ [0,1] denote a school that is ranked at the s× 100% posi-
tion among all schools2 and assume p≤ 0.5. Consider s∗ = 1−p+pβα. Then schools ranked higher
than s∗ have a small loss in utility in the biased setting. The schools ranked after s∗ only admit G2
students and see some increase in utility, with the highest utility increase right after s∗.
Proposition 2 suggests that, since the average quality of admitted students does not seem to be
affected much by bias, schools may have less of an incentive to remove it, especially when G2 forms
the minority group.
We next consider in Section 3.3 the effect of bias on the diversity of students in differently ranked
schools. When there is no bias, the proportion of G2 students at every school is uniformly p, since
the distributions of potentials are the same for both G1 and G2 students. However, when there is
bias, the proportion of G2 students at top rank schools is reduced significantly.
Proposition 3. (informal) Consider again s∗ = 1−p+pβα as in Proposition 2. In the biased
setting, the proportion of G2 students is reduced to
pβα
1−p+pβα for schools ranked higher than s
∗, and
for all schools ranked lower than s∗ the proportion of G2 students is 1.
Having quantified the impact of bias on both schools and students, we next analyze potential
interventions that can mitigate these consequences.
Q3. What can schools do to remove bias (i.e., help G2 students reveal their true potentials)? How
much can a school’s utility change from such interventions?
This question is investigated in Section 4.1. We consider the intervention where schools conduct
extensive analysis of students who are slightly below their admission criteria (i.e., students who are
originally assigned to slightly lower ranked schools), with the goal of reviewing their true potentials.
We call this process interviewing. Given that conducting interviews takes resources, we assume
that every school has certain interview capacities. We analyze the change in schools’ utility under
such interviewing scheme.
Proposition 4. (informal) The change in the utility of schools due to targeted interviews
can be characterized in three cases: (a) If all schools interview, the gain that each school has is
negligible, (b) From a single school s’s perspective, if all other schools interview students but school
s, then its utility will not change much, (c) If s is the only school that decides to interview students,
then its gain in utility is significant, especially if it does not belong neither to the best, nor to the
worst schools.
2 Note that for two schools s and s′, if s < s′, s is ranked higher than s′. Thus, a school s is a top school, or higher
ranked school, if s is small and vice versa.
7Therefore, when all schools conduct interviews, schools do not gain much. Hence, the decentral-
ized process of interviewing does not look very promising since the gain in utility for each individual
school is minimal. Given that there is an overlap in the students that similarly ranked schools inter-
view, students have to go through many interviews and reveal their true potentials to the schools
separately. Moreover, being aware of interview dates and able to attend them has traditionally
been another source of discrimination, for instance, in New York City high schools (Shapiro 2019).
We next explore a more societal level, centralized form of intervention, which can be thought
of, for instance, as providing extra training/resources, developing problem solving groups, or team
building exercises. The idea that disparity in opportunities should be fought by expanding the
access to test preparation has been gaining traction in the past years. For instance, in New York
City, there has been growing support for free SHSAT preparation for middle-school students (Edu-
cation Equity 2020).
Q4. What can the government or other public agencies do to remove bias, i.e., what are some
school-independent interventions? How much can students benefit from such interventions? Who
should such interventions target given limited resources?
We generically call this societal interventions vouchers. We assume that only G2 students will
use vouchers, and this will have the effect of removing their bias. This is justified by the fact
that G1 students should already have had access to, say, extra training (this is why they were G1
students in the beginning). We investigate two measures of unfairness or mistreatment (i.e., positive
displacement) of G2 students motivated by axiomatically justified notions of (in)equality (Kumar
and Kleinberg 2000, Bertsimas et al. 2011), and for each one, we give explicit formula on who are
the G2 students that should be debiased in order to minimize this measure of mistreatment. The
two measures we consider are 1) the maximum mistreatment (in absolute value or in lexicographical
order) and 2) the average mistreatment of all mistreated G2 students. In both cases, informally
speaking, the students we should target are those whose potential is close to that of the most
misplaced student, hence students with average potential. We find that, in contrast to targeted
interviews by schools, distributing vouchers or training resources based on observed potentials of
students are more effective. For the first measure, we show the following proposition.
Theorem 1. (informal) The maximum mistreatment without any intervention is (1− p)(1−
βα). Let ĉ denote the proportion of G2 students to whom we can provide vouchers. Assuming
p < 1− βα, the maximum reduction in maximum mistreatment increases piecewise linearly with
respect to ĉ, depending on the magnitude of ĉ (see Figure 4).
For the second measure, we show the following proposition.
8Theorem 2. (informal) The average mistreatment of all mistreated students without any
intervention is 1
2
(1−p)(1−βα). The maximum reduction in average mistreatment under this inter-
vention increases about linearly with respect to the amount of resources given, as shown in Figure 4,
assuming p < 1−βα and p < 0.5.
The above results complement the growing stream of papers that characterize trade-offs between
multiple metrics of fairness, specifically for statistical measures of fairness such as calibration across
groups, balance for positive class, and balance for negative class (Kleinberg et al. 2017). In contrast
to statistical measures, where there exist impossibility results of satisfying multiple fairness metrics
simultaneously (even approximately), we show that the average as well as maximum mistreatment
is minimized in our problem by targeting a similar set of students.
We next change the assumption on the distribution of students’ potentials from Pareto to Gaus-
sian (for e.g., SAT scores are believed to follow a Gaussian distribution (Taube and Linden 1989)).
In this setting, parameters of the distribution (i.e., mean and standard deviation) are estimated
from real data on the SAT scores of high school students in New York City: see Section 6.2 for
details.
Q5. Do the takeaways from answers to questions Q1-Q4 still hold if the potentials of students
follow a Gaussian distribution, with parameters obtained as discussed above?
Quantitatively, we extend our analysis to general distributions in Section 5. Qualitatively, most
takeaways remain, but there are some differences. From schools’ perspective, we find that the top
schools are distinctly affected by bias in the system, and therefore, individually each school has
an incentive to conduct interview. However, when all the schools interview, then the change in
utility is negligible compared to the status-quo. Hence, one should again rely on a central authority
for debiasing the students. Under both measures discussed in Q4, vouchers should be provided to
middle-top students – i.e., students above average but not top students. This is different from the
case of the Pareto distribution, where we target middle students.
We next comment on the applicability of our model under perturbed assumptions.
Q6. Can the assumptions made in our model for mathematical tractability can be relaxed, while
keeping the results qualitatively similar? In particular, what if we move from a continuous to a
discrete model, assume β non-constant, or assume that not all students that are offered a voucher
will use it? What if the majority students face bias, instead of minority, i.e., p > 0.5?
We investigate the first two questions empirically. In particular, for a fixed ĉ (amount of
resources), we compare the average mistreatment when the set of students given by Theorem 2 is
debiased and when the optimal continuous interval of students obtained numerically is debiased.
Our experiments, reported in Section 6.1, show that results in those two cases are very similar,
9even if all assumptions are relaxed at the same time. We believe this gives evidence that our results
extend well beyond the simple model studied in this paper, and can be impactful in more realistic
settings, where our assumptions hold only approximately. Recall that under the assumption that
G2 students form a minority group, we conclude that schools do not have an incentive to remove
the bias themselves, hence a centralized action is needed (see Q3). Similar results are found when
p > 0.5.
We believe our work asks interesting questions that can help understand the impact of incon-
sistency in evaluation mechanisms across demographic groups. We summarize the key takeaways
from our framework in Section 7.
2. A continuous matching market
We introduce a simple matching market, where students rank schools following a unique strict
order, and schools rank students following a unique order. Both schools and students are continuous
sets. We let the student population be a set Θ, and we associate to Θ a probability distribution on
the potentials of students. For each student θ ∈Θ, we use Z(θ) to denote his/her true potential.
Unless otherwise stated, we assume Z(Θ) ∼ Pareto(1, α), and thus, all students have potentials
at least 1. We let µ : Θ→ [0,1] be the ranking function based on students’ true potentials, with
rankings normalized to be between 0 and 1, and a student θ with a smaller value of µ(θ) is a
student who has higher potential. Hence for θ, θ′ ∈Θ, whenever Z(θ′)>Z(θ), we have µ(θ′)<µ(θ).
Students with the same potential are ranked at the same level.
We assume that p fraction of the students belong to Group 2 (G2). G2 students are the ones
whose perceived potentials are biased by a constant multiplicative factor β ∈ (0,1]. Students who
are not in Group 2 are called Group 1 (G1) students. Their perceived potentials are exactly their
true potentials and they account for 1− p proportion of the population.
We let Ẑ(θ) denote the perceived potential of a student θ ∈Θ. That is, if θ ∈G1, then Ẑ(θ) =
Z(θ); otherwise, Ẑ(θ) = βZ(θ). For G1 students, the cdf (cumulative distribution function) of their
perceived (or equivalently true) potentials is denoted by F1. Similarly, let F2 denote the cdf of the
perceived potentials of G2 students. Since Z(Θ)∼Pareto(1, α), we have
F1(t) = 1− t−α; F2(t) = 1−βαt−α.
Note that both function F1(·) and F2(·) take in the value of perceived potentials. Moreover, the
domain of F1 is [1,∞), whereas the domain of F2 is [β,∞).
Let µ̂ : Θ→ [0,1] be the function that ranks students based on their perceived potentials, with
again rankings normalized to be between 0 and 1. It is also convenient to define the ccdf (tail
distribution) of students’ perceived potentials. That is, let F¯1 := 1− F1 and F¯2 := 1− F2 be the
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ccdf of their corresponding distributions. Then, for a student θ ∈ Θ, µ̂(θ) counts the fraction of
students whose perceived potential is higher than that of θ. That is:
µ̂(θ) =
{
(1− p)F¯1(Ẑ(θ)) + pF¯2(Ẑ(θ)) if θ ∈G1,
(1− p)F¯1(Ẑ(θ)∨ 1) + pF¯2(Ẑ(θ)) if θ ∈G2,
(1)
where ∨ is the maximum operator. We say that student θ is assigned to school µ̂(θ). Note that,
when β = 1 (i.e., no bias), formula (1) computes µ(θ): µ(θ) = F¯1(Z(θ)) for θ ∈Θ.
Intuitively, µ(θ) represents the school that student θ should be assigned to, whereas µ̂(θ) is the
school where student θ is actually assigned to due to bias. For γ ∈ {µ, µ̂} and s ∈ [0,1], we denote
by γ−1(s) the set of students assigned to school s under matching γ. In addition, we denote by
uγ(s) the utility of school s under matching γ, which is defined to be the average true potential of
its assigned students. That is,
uγ(s) :=
∫
θ∈γ−1(s)∩G1
Z(θ)dF1(Ẑ(θ)) +
∫
θ∈γ−1(s)∩G2
Z(θ)dF2(Ẑ(θ)). (2)
To be mathematically precise, we define a matching3 in this market to be a surjective measurable
function γ from Θ to [0,1] (i.e., students to schools), such that the mass of students mapped to a
set of school S ⊆ [0,1] coincides with the standard Lebesgue measure of S. One can easily check
that µ and µ̂ defined above are matchings.
Discrete vs. continuous markets. Traditionally, matching markets are assumed to be dis-
crete (Gale and Shapley 1962, Roth and Sotomayor 1992). This is a faithful description of reality,
where goods and buyers mostly form discrete sets. There has been however, in recent years, an
interest for models where one or both sides of the markets are continuous (Arnosti 2019, Azevedo
and Leshno 2016). This is justified by the fact that, in many applications, markets are large,
hence predictions in continuous markets often translate with a good degree of accuracy to discrete
ones. Moreover, continuous markets are often analytically more tractable than discrete ones (see,
again, Arnosti (2019), Azevedo and Leshno (2016)). Our case is no exception: the continuous model
allows us to deduce precise mathematical formulae, while we show through experiments that those
formulae are a good approximation to the discrete case. We also provide additional experiments
evaluating the robustness of our results under relaxation of assumptions, such as that of a unique
bias factor for all students in G2. We remark that the goal of this study is not to provide a mech-
anism to admits students to schools, for which the assumption of all rankings of schools as well as
of students being the same would be too simplistic. On the contrary, as we want to understand the
3 In formula, any surjective function γ from Θ to [0,1] is a matching if ν(γ−1(S)) := (1−p)∫
θ∈γ−1(S)∩G1 dF1(Ẑ(θ)) +
p
∫
θ∈γ−1(S)∩G2 dF2(Ẑ(θ)) is equal to the standard Lebesgue measure of S for all S ⊆ [0,1].
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impact of bias at a macroscopic level, we believe our approximation to be meaningful and useful
since as in our model any reasonable mechanism would output the same assignment4.
3. Analysis of the market
Our first goal is to understand how much bias affects agents in the market. In particular, we would
like to answer the following question: what is the loss of efficiency for agents of the market when
all students θ ∈Θ are assigned to school µ̂(θ) instead of µ(θ)? We propose to measure this loss of
efficiency in three ways: first, for students; second, for schools; and third, as a diversity measure.
3.1. Students’ perspective
Formally, we define µ̂(θ)− µ(θ) to be the displacement of a student θ ∈ Θ. Note that if θ ∈ G1,
the displacement is non-positive, and if θ ∈G2, it is non-negative. The displacement can be easily
calculated using the formulae for µ and µ̂ given in (1).
Proposition 1. For any student θ ∈G2, the displacement µ̂(θ)−µ(θ) is given by:
µ̂(θ)−µ(θ) =
(1− p) (Z(θ))
−α (
β−α− 1) if Z(θ)≥ 1
β
,
(1− p)
(
1− (Z(θ))−α
)
if Z(θ)≤ 1
β
.
And for any student θ ∈ G1, we have µ̂(θ) − µ(θ) = (−p+ pβα) (Z(θ))−α . Thus, the maximum
displacement of (1− p)(1− βα) is experienced by a G2 student with potential 1/β; and the most
significant negative displacement of −p(1−βα) is experienced by a G1 student with potential 1.
One can think of this result intuitively in the following way. Starting from the top school, G1
students gradually take more seats than they deserve, and thus gradually push G2 students to worse
schools than what they deserve. This process stops once all G1 students are assigned to schools,
and the only students that remain to be assigned are G2 students. As a result, in lower ranked
schools, all students are G2 students. Hence, the difference in ranks of the schools G2 students are
matched to decreases towards the end.
The displacement function is plotted for one set of parameters in Figure 1a. We give another
perspective on those function in Figure 1b. X-axis are schools they should attend in the unbiased
setting, whereas y-axis are schools they actually attend. The lower left corner is the best school
and the upper right corner is the school that is ranked the lowest. The green dotted line is a line
of slope one, representing the place a student should be placed on the figure if there are no bias in
the system. The magenta line represents G1 students and thus is below the green line; the blue line
represents G2 students and thus is above the green line. The red cross marks the student whose
4 In the classical discrete model, when schools and students have unique ranking, there is only one stable assignment,
which is also Pareto-optimal for students. A similar statement holds for the appropriate translations of those concepts
to our model.
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(a) Pareto Density and Displacements of students (b) Schools students should versus actually attend
Figure 1 Displacement of students: non-positive for G1 students and non-negative for G2 students.
true potential is 1/β and who experiences the maximum placements among all G2 students. Note
that the unequal impact of bias on the two groups is immediately evident from Figure 1b, which
then strongly advocates the need for bias-reducing interventions, as we discuss in Section 4.
3.2. Schools’ perspective
We discuss next the impact of bias on the average true potential of students accepted by a school.
Let s∈ [0,1] denote the school that is ranked in the s×100% position among the continuous range
of schools. As next proposition shows, the impact on the utilities of schools is negligible for all
schools other than the lowest ranked schools. This is because for each school, although the average
potential of assigned G1 students is lower than it should be, its assigned G2 students have much
higher true potentials. And thus, the toll on the utility due to unqualified G1 students is partially
canceled out by the overqualified G2 students and the net effect is minimal. On the other hand,
some lower ranked schools that only admit G2 students fare better in the biased setting (since they
admit over-qualified G2 candidates).
Proposition 2. For school s, its utility under the unbiased model is
uµ(s) = s
− 1α .
Its utility in the biased model is
uµ̂(s) =

1− p+ pβα
1− p+ pβα+1
(
s
1− p+ pβα
)− 1α
if s≤ 1− p+ pβα,(
s− (1− p)
p
)− 1α
if s > 1− p+ pβα.
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Figure 2 Comparing schools’ utilities in biased and
unbiased setting; schools’ incentives of
interviewing.
Figure 3 Proportion of G2 students in higher ranked
schools decreases significantly in the biased
setting.
Proof. In order for a student θ to be assigned to a school that is at least as good as s, his or her
perceived potential Ẑ(θ) needs to be high enough to satisfy (1− p)F¯1(1∨ Ẑ(θ)) + pF¯2(Ẑ(θ))≤ s.
That is, we need
Ẑ(θ)≥ d(s) :=

(
s
1− p+ pβα
)− 1α
if s≤ 1− p+ pβα,
β
(
s− (1− p)
p
)− 1α
if s > 1− p+ pβα.
We call d(s) the cutoff for school s. With the cutoffs, we can compute the utilities of schools.
We start with the formula for uµ̂(s). First note that by Bayes rule, the probability that a given
student with perceived potential Ẑ(θ)≥ 1 belongs to G1 is 1−p1−p+pβα+1 . Using (1), observe that the
G2 student whose perceived potential is 1 (i.e., true potential is
1
β
) is matched to school 1−p+pβα.
Thus, if s≥ 1− p+ pβα, s is only assigned with G2 students. Therefore, when s≤ 1− p+ pβα,
uµ̂(s) =
1− p
1− p+ pβα+1d(s) +
pβα+1
1− p+ pβα+1
d(s)
β
=
1− p+ pβα
1− p+ pβα+1
(
s
1− p+ pβα
)− 1α
.
And when s > 1− p+ pβα, we have
uµ̂(s) = d(s)/β =
(
s− (1− p)
p
)− 1α
.
One the other hand, when there is no bias against G2 students, we simply have uµ(s) = s
− 1α . 
In Figure 2, we plot functions uµ(s) and uµ̂(s) (the two thick lines) as a visualization of the
impact of bias on utilities of schools. Unlike the negative impact biases place on G2 students, from
schools’ perspective, the negative impact is negligible. Hence, from a operational perspective, it
may be hard to convince schools to autonomously put in place mechanisms to alleviate the effect
of bias. We discuss this more in Section 4.1.
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3.3. Diversity in schools
We now investigate how bias affects diversity in schools. Let pr(s) (resp. p̂r(s)) be the proportion
of G2 students assigned to school s when there is no bias (resp. there is bias) against G2 students.
Proposition 3. Without bias, we have pr(s) = p. Under the biased setting, we have
p̂r(s) =

pβα
1− p+ pβα if s≤ 1− p+ pβ
α,
1 if s > 1− p+ pβα.
Proof. The claim pr(s) = p for all s ∈ [0,1] follows from the fact that the distribution of true
potentials is the same for G1 and G2 students. The formula for p̂r(s) follows from the discussion
in proof of Proposition 2. 
A visual comparison of pr(s) and p̂r(s) can be found in Figure 3 for different values of β and p.
4. Mitigating the effect of bias
In this section, we discuss several alternatives for moderating the effect of bias. We call these
actions bias mitigations, and investigate two of them. We remark that, in both interventions, no
student θ ∈ G1 will be matched to a school worse than µ(θ). This is because our interventions
focus on helping (certain) G2 students reveal their true potentials, hence for any G1 student θ, no
student with potential lower than Z(θ) can have a perceived potential higher than Ẑ(θ) =Z(θ).
4.1. Interviewing
One way schools can act to mitigate the negative effects of bias is to spend resources that could
reveal the true potentials of students. We call such a process interviewing. We assume that, when
a school s decides to conduct interviews, it is able to observe the true potentials of all G2 students
that were original matched to schools from s to s+ ivs for some constant ivs that represents the
amount of students a school is able to interview. In this section, we investigate the incentives
of conducting interviews from schools’ perspective: does interviewing allow a school to drastically
improve the quality of the students it is matched to?
The first situation we consider is the simple case where all schools conduct interviews and all
schools have the same interview capacity (i.e., ivs = iv for all schools s). Let d
i
1(s) and d
i
2(s) be the
cutoffs in terms of true potentials each school s has for G1 and G2 students respectively, and let µ˜
denote the resulting matching.
Proposition 4. The utilities of schools when all schools have interview capacity iv is:
uµ˜(s) =

(1− p)[di1(s)]−(α+1) · di1(s) + p[di2(s)]−(α+1) · di2(s)
(1− p)[di1(s)]−(α+1) + p[di2(s)]−(α+1)
if di1(s)> 1
di2(s) otherwise ,
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where 
di1(s) = d
i
2(s) = F¯
−1
1 (s) if F¯1
(
d(min(1, s+ iv))/β
)≥ s
di2(s) = d(min(1, s+ iv))/β
di1(s) = F¯
−1
1
(
s− pF¯1(di2(s))
1− p
)
if F¯1
(
d(min(1, s+ iv))/β
)
< s
Proof. By Bayes rule, we have that for school s, its proportion of G1 students is
(1− p)[di1(s)]−(α+1)
(1− p)[di1(s)]−(α+1) + p[di2(s)]−(α+1)
.
Hence, the formula for uµ˜(s) when d
i
1(s)> 1 follows from the same arguments given in the proof
of Proposition 2. When di1(s) = 1, only G2 students are assigned to s and thus, uµ˜(s) = d
i
2(s).
Now, for the cutoffs, consider a fixed school s. Under the continuous model, the amount of
students school s is matched to has Lebesgue measure 0, so it is more useful to think of the
cutoffs in terms of all the schools that are at least as good as s. If F¯1
(
d(min(1, s+ iv))/β
) ≥ s,
that is, if all schools that are as least as good as s interview more G2 students than they are
willing to admit, then the cutoffs for G1 and G2 students are the same. On the other hand, if
F¯1
(
d(min(1, s+ iv))/β
)
< s, then schools that are at least as good as s do not interview enough G2
students and as a result, they admit all the G2 interviewees, and fill in the rest with G1 students.
This gives rise to the formulae for cutoffs di1(s) and d
i
2(s). 
The utilities of schools under this first situation, i.e., uµ˜(s), with iv= 0.05 are plotted in Figure 2.
We consider two additional situations, corresponding to the two additional lines in the figure. The
dashed line represents the utility of each school s if s is the only school that interviews students.
In this case, school s’s utility is d(s)/β. On the contrary, the dotted captures the utility of school
s when s is the only school that does not interview students. And in this case, its utility is di1(s).
Although schools have the incentive to conduct interview if it is the only school doing so, when all
schools adopt the same strategy, the gain in utility is minimal.
4.2. Vouchers
Suppose a central agency can select a subsets of students to debias. This can be achieved, for
instance, by giving to (a limited amount of) students free vouchers to attend preparatory classes
for exams or by spending resources to build a community of students that explores learning as a
group. Given a certain mass of available vouchers, we want to investigate which is the subset of
students to whom these vouchers should be offered.
In the following, we mostly focus on G2 students since they experience a positive displacement
(i.e., the school they are matched to in the biased setting has lower rank compared to school
they are matched to in the unbiased setting) and they are the ones who need vouchers. We will
henceforth refer to the displacement experienced by G2 students as mistreatment.
16
(a) Maximum mistreatment (b) PAUC
Figure 4 Effect of bias after debiasing the best set of G2 students given ĉ.
Recall that µ(θ) and µ̂(θ) denote the school a student θ is assigned in the unbiased and biased
setting respectively. Now let µ˜ : Θ→ [0,1] be the ranking of students after the bias mitigation. We
consider two measures of unfairness. The first is the most mistreated student:
mm(µ˜) := sup
θ∈Θ
(µ˜−µ)(θ).
The second is the positive area under the curve (PAUC):
σ(µ˜) :=
∫
θ∈Θ
max(µ˜−µ,0)dF1(Z(θ)).
Note that this latter measure does not take into account students that are assigned to a school better
than the ones they would deserve. This is because we are interested in quantifying the improvement
for mistreated G2 students, rather than the penalization for G1 students. In 1979 Tanner Lectures
on Human Values, Sen (1979) argued that defining the basis of any desired notion of equality is
important. We take the view of achieving equality by minimizing the mistreatment of G2 students,
while satisfying a baseline treatment for G1 students (since schools’ capacities are fixed, if a G2
student is admitted to a better school after debiasing, (s)he must displace another student, possibly
a G1 student.). Moreover, the maximum mistreatment among all students corresponds to the
axiomatically established and well-studied min-max notion of fairness (Kumar and Kleinberg 2000),
and the positive area under curve corresponds to average mistreatment of group G2, i.e., it is a
group notion of fairness (Conitzer et al. 2019, Dwork and Ilvento 2018, Marsh and Schilling 1994).
As we show next, the choice is quite similar, whether we want to minimize the most mistreated
student or the PAUC. Before stating the results formally, we need to introduce new notations. For
ĉ∈ [0,1], let T (ĉ) to be all sets T ⊆ [1,∞) such that ∫
t∈T dF1(t)≤ ĉ. Here, ĉ models the amount of
resources or vouchers, and each T ∈ T (ĉ) represents the potentials of G2 students to whom vouchers
are provided so that their true potentials will be revealed. That is, for θ ∈G2 such that Z(θ)∈ T ,
we now have Ẑ(θ) =Z(θ) after the intervention.
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(a) optimal correction when ĉ is large (b) optimal correction when ĉ is small
Figure 5 Maximum mistreatment before and after optimal voucher correction.
Let µT : Θ→ [0,1] be the ranking of the students after G2 students whose real potentials lie in
T have been debiased. In addition, let Tmm(ĉ) be the collection of sets T such that sup(µT −µ) is
minimized. Next result gives an explicit characterization of those sets, assuming
p < 1−βα. (3)
This is a reasonable assumption because of the following. First, [2,3.5] is a reasonable range to
assume for the parameter α in terms of academic achievements due to Clauset et al. (2009). Then,
if we, for example, assume α= 3, even with mild biases towards G2 students, say with β = .9, we
only need p < 1− .93 = .271. And with stronger bias, say β = .8, the requirement on p, which is
p < 1− .83 = .488, is more relaxed.
Theorem 1. Assume p < 1− βα. Then there exists a set T = [Z∗1 ,Z∗2 ] ∈ Tmm(ĉ) such that all
other sets from Tmm(ĉ) differ from T on a set of measure zero. If ĉ≥ (1−p)(1−β
α)
1−p+1−βα , then
Z∗1 =
(
(1− p) + ( 1
βα
− 1)ĉ
1
βα
− p
)− 1α
and Z∗2 =
(
(1− p)(1− ĉ)
1
βα
− p
)− 1α
,
and mm(µ[Z∗1 ,Z∗2 ]) = (1− p)(1− βα) 1−ĉ1−pβα , reduced from mm(µ̂) = (1− p)(1− βα). Conversely, if
ĉ≤ (1−p)(1−βα)
1−p+1−βα , then:
Z∗1 =
(
(1− p− ĉ)βα
1− p + ĉ
)− 1α
and Z∗2 =
(
(1− p− ĉ)βα
1− p
)− 1α
,
and mm(µ[Z∗1 ,Z∗2 ]) = (1− p− ĉ)(1−βα) + pĉ.
We include a proof of Theorem 1 in the e-companion, Section A. The main idea is to first assume
that the set T forms a connected set (i.e., a closed interval). Then, we can express mm(µT ) as a
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(a) optimal correction when ĉ is large (b) optimal correction when ĉ is small
Figure 6 PAUC before and after optimal voucher correction.
function of the endpoints of T and work out the minimizing interval. We next drop the assumption
that T is connected and show that the optimal set of students to debias remains the same. The
analysis we give is actually more general, and presents results under which vouchers improve the
mistreatment of students lexicographically. Interestingly, it also shows that, if vouchers are not
distributed carefully, one may actually worsen the most mistreated students.
A pictorial representation of Theorem 1 is given in Figure 5. The two sub-figures correspond to
two choices of ĉ. Moreover, Figure 4a shows how much mm(µ[Z∗1 ,Z∗2 ]) decreases as ĉ, the amount of
resources, increases.
Besides minimizing the maximum of students’ mistreatment, we also investigate the objective
of minimizing the aggregate amount of mistreatment received by all G2 students. In this case, we
restrict our attention to debiasing G2 students whose potentials are in a connected set - which is
a justifiable implementation in practice (otherwise a student might feel unfairly treated given that
someone with a better potential as well as someone with a worse potential receives the voucher).
This assumption also makes our analysis more tractable. In particular, let T c(ĉ) ⊆ T (ĉ) be all
connected sets T ∈ T (ĉ). That is, T c(ĉ) := {[t1, t2] : F¯1(t1)− F¯1(t2)≤ ĉ}. In addition, let T cauc(ĉ) be
the collection of sets T ∈ T c(ĉ) such that σ(µT −µ) is minimized. The next result gives an explicit
description of the set T cauc(ĉ) when assuming, again, (3) and additionally p < 0.5.
Theorem 2. Assume p < 1−βα and p < 0.5 Then T cauc(ĉ) is made of a unique set T = [Z∗1 ,Z∗2 ].
If ĉ≥ (1−p)(1−βα)
2−p−βα−pβα+pβ2α , then:
Z∗2 =
(
(1− p)(1− ĉ)
pβα + 1
βα
− 2p
)− 1α
and Z∗1 =
(
(1− p)(1− ĉ)
pβα + 1
βα
− 2p + ĉ
)− 1α
,
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ĉ Tmm(ĉ) = [Z1,Z2] Tauc(ĉ) = [Z ′1,Z ′2] Z1−Z ′1
0.10 [1.2252, 1.3111] [1.2187, 1.3026] 0.0065
0.20 [1.2022, 1.3861] [1.1903, 1.3653] 0.0119
0.30 [1.1802, 1.4803] [1.1644, 1.4421] 0.0158
0.40 [1.1461, 1.5584] [1.1346, 1.5203] 0.0115
0.50 [1.1156, 1.6560] [1.1070, 1.6155] 0.0086
0.60 [1.0881, 1.7839] [1.0819, 1.7403] 0.0063
0.70 [1.0632, 1.9635] [1.0589, 1.9154] 0.0043
0.80 [1.0404, 2.2476] [1.0377, 2.1926] 0.0026
Table 2 Compare the optimal ranges of G2 students to debias under two measures of unfairness, under
parameters α= 3, β = .8, and p= .25.
and σ(µ[Z∗1 ,Z∗2 ]) =
1
2
(1−p)(1−βα)
(
( 1
βα
−p)(1−ĉ)2
pβα+ 1
βα
−2p
)
, dropped from σ(µ̂) = 1
2
(1−p)(1−βα). Conversely,
if ĉ≤ (1−p)(1−βα)
2−p−βα−pβα+pβ2α , then:
Z∗2 =
(
(pβα− 1)ĉ+ (1− p)
(1− p) 1
βα
)− 1α
and Z∗1 =
(
(pβα− 1)ĉ+ (1− p)
(1− p) 1
βα
+ ĉ
)− 1α
,
and σ(µ[Z∗1 ,Z∗2 ]) =
1
2
(1− p)(1− ĉ)2− 1
2
βα
(
[(pβα−1)ĉ+(1−p)]2
1−p + pĉ
2
)
.
A pictorial representation of Theorem 2 is given in Figure 6. Again, two sub-figures are presented
for two different choices of ĉ. Figure 4b shows how much σ(µ[Z∗1 ,Z∗2 ]) decreases as ĉ, the amount of
resources, increases. The proof of Theorem 2 is given in the e-companion, Section B.
Table 2 shows that, for reasonable choices of the parameters, Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 give very
close intervals. That is, the optimal intervals of potentials of students to whom vouchers should be
distributed under our two measures of unfairness approximately coincide. Moreover, both measures
suggest that vouchers should be given to the average (middle performing) students.
We remark that the current distribution of vouchers violates individual fairness (Dwork et al.
2012). It does not treat similar individuals similarly, as seen by individuals at the boundary of the
debiasing interval. However one could get around this by randomization or distributing “partial”
vouchers. This would not change the interval to be targeted, however would likely smooth out the
boundaries of the interval. We leave this as an extension for future work.
5. Extensions to General Distributions of Potentials
Besides Pareto distribution, our framework can also be applied to any other distributions of student
potentials. For ease of notation, assume the distribution is continuous and let f and F¯ denote the
pdf and ccdf of students’ true potentials respectively. In calculating the displacement of G1 and G2
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students, similar to (1), one can compute µ̂(θ), the school student θ actually attend due to bias in
the evaluation, using
µ̂(θ) =
{
(1− p)F¯ (Z(θ)) + pF¯ (Z(θ)/β) if θ ∈G1,
(1− p)F¯ (βZ(θ)) + pF¯ (Z(θ)) if θ ∈G2;
and when β = 1, we obtain µ(θ) = F¯ (Z(θ)), the school student θ should attend.
In analyzing the utilities of schools, the cutoff for school s, d(s), is the perceived potential ẑ such
that (1− p)F¯ (ẑ) + pF¯ (ẑ/β) = s. Thus, the utility of school s under µ̂ is
uµ̂(s) =
(1− p)f(d(s))
(1− p)f(d(s)) + pf(d(s)/β) · d(s) +
pf(d(s)/β)
(1− p)f(d(s)) + pf(d(s)/β) ·
d(s)
β
.
Note that when β = 1, we recover uµ(s) = F¯
−1(s).
Next, consider the two approaches of bias mitigation. We start with schools’ incentives of inter-
viewing students. Let µ˜ denote the ranking of students when all schools decide to interview and
all schools have the same interview capacity. Proposition 4 can be generalized as
uµ˜(s) =
(1− p)f(di1(s))
(1− p)f(di1(s)) + pf(di2(s))
di1(s) +
pf(di2(s))
(1− p)f(di1(s)) + pf(di2(s))
di2(s),
where di1(s) and d
i
2(s), the cutoffs in term of true potentials for G1 and G2 students respectively,
follow the same formulae as those given in Proposition 4 with F¯1 replaced by F¯ .
For the intervention, assume G2 students whose true potentials are within [Z1,Z2] are offered
the vouchers and have their true potentials revealed, then one can compute µ˜(θ) for θ ∈G2 by the
following formula
µ˜(θ) =

(1− p)F¯ (βZ(θ)) + pF¯ (Z(θ)) + pmax (0, F¯ (βZ(θ)∨Z1)− F¯ (Z2)) if Z(θ)>Z2,
(1− p)F¯ (Z(θ)) + p(F¯ (Z(θ))− F¯ (Z2))+ pF¯ (Z(θ)/β ∨Z2) if Z(θ)∈ [Z1,Z2],
(1− p)F¯ (βZ(θ)) + pF¯ (Z(θ)) if Z(θ)<Z1.
Although closed form solution may not exist in general when finding the best range of G2 students
to offer vouchers under the two measures of unfairness, one can use simulations and grid search to
find such best range. In Section 6.2, we present a detailed analysis in the case of normal distribution
when looking at the SAT scores of New York City high school students.
6. Experimental Case Studies
In Section 6.1, we relax some of our model assumptions and empirically compare the results we
obtain against the theoretical findings of the previous sections. In Section 6.2, we analyze our
framework based on the SAT scores of NYC high school students, which follows a normal distri-
bution.
21
Figure 7 Assuming a constant number of 100 students per school, we compare the PAUC when debiasing G2
students in the theoretically optimal interval given in Theorem 2 versus the PAUC when debiasing G2
students in the empirically optimal interval. The PAUC without intervention is presented as a baseline.
6.1. Empirical validation of the robustness of our conclusions
In this section, we provide an empirical investigation of the robustness of the results in Theorem 2.
In particular, we consider models where one or more of the following modifications are implemented:
the continuous sets representing schools and students are replaced by discrete sets, with schools
having finite capacities; we allow each G2 student to a random bias factor; we assume that only a
percentage of students receiving a voucher will use it (and hence be debiased). For each of those
models, given a fixed set of resources ĉ, we compare the PAUC under the theoretically optimal
interval given in Theorem 2 and the PAUC under the optimal interval obtained numerically (by
using a sliding window). Results are reported in Figure 7, Figure 8a, Figure 8b (when only one
assumption is relaxed) and Figure 9 (when all three assumptions are relaxed). They show that,
depending on the deviation from our model, the predictions from Theorem 2 stay between close
to and very close to the optimum, and in all cases provide a very significant improvement over the
status quo. In the following, we discuss more in detail each experiment.
From continuous to discrete. We first investigate how accurately the results on our model
translate to a model where both sides of the market are discrete. Assuming a constant number of
100 students per school, we carried out a set of experiments where the number of schools ranges
from 10 to 200. Due to the randomness resulting from discretization, for each experiment, we
conducted 100 simulations and report here their mean and standard error of the mean in Figure 7.
In fact, the standard errors are very small and thus they do not show in the figure. When the
number of schools is more than 50, the theoretically optimal interval given in Theorem 2 for the
continuous-continuous model performs well for the discrete model as well. And regardless of the
magnitude of discretization (i.e., number of schools), the theoretical formula is able to reduce PAUC
significantly from the PAUC under the situation without any intervention (by close to 50%).
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(a) Each G2 student’s discount factor β is drawn
uniformly randomly from interval [0.8− ε,0.8 + ε].
(b) Each G2 student who is offered a voucher is able
to reveal his true potential with certain probability.
Figure 8 All simulations are carried out on instances with 10,000 students and 100 schools, where each school
has a capacity of 100 students. We compare the PAUC when debiasing G2 students in the theoretically
optimal interval given in Theorem 2 versus the PAUC when debiasing G2 students in the empirically
optimal interval. The PAUC without intervention is presented as a baseline.
Figure 9 Assuming each school has 100 seats, we carried out four sets of experiments, where in each experiment,
the variation ε in the discount factor β varies from 0 to 0.20. These experiments differ in debiasing
probability, either 60% or 90%, and/or the number of schools, either 50 or 150. We compare the PAUC
when debiasing G2 students in the theoretically optimal interval given in Theorem 2 versus the PAUC
when debiasing G2 students in the empirically optimal interval. The PAUC without intervention is
presented as a baseline.
Due to this result, for the following experiments, simulations are run on instances with 10,000
students and 100 schools, and each school has a capacity of 100 students.
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Figure 10 Impact of bias on students when p > 0.5. Figure 11 Impact of bias on schools when p > 0.5.
Non-constant bias. We next investigate the assumption of constant discount factor β for all G2
students. In this set of experiments, we allow β to vary among G2 students by different amounts.
Results are shown in Figure 8a. When variation in β is small (i.e., ε is small), the PAUC obtained
using the formula in Theorem 2 is close the empirically optimal value. However, as the amount
of variation in β increases, the discrepancy between the theoretically optimal value the empirical
one increases. However, debiasing G2 students in the theoretically optimal interval can regardless
reduce the PAUC significantly from the situation without any intervention.
Students may not use vouchers. We then investigate the assumption that once a G2 student
is offered the voucher, (s)he is able to reveal his true potential with 100% probability. In this set
of experiments, we vary this probability from 50% to 100%. Results are presented in Figure 8b. As
the probability decreases, the optimal PAUC, theoretically as well as empirically, increases. This
increase is intuitive because when debiasing probability is small, many vouchers are essentially
“wasted”. However, the discrepancy between the PAUC under the theoretically optimal interval and
that under the empirically optimal interval is relatively small, even when the debiasing probability
is only 50%. Again, standard errors are very small and thus do not appear in the figure.
Simultaneous relaxation of all the three modeling assumptions. As a final step, we combine
the three above-mentioned situations together. The results are summarized in Figure 9. For a fixed
level of debiasing probability and a number of schools, the discrepancy between the theoretically
optimal PAUC and the empirically optimal PAUC (i.e., comparing solid lines and dashed lines of the
same color) is comparable to those seen in Figure 8a. That is, the influence of variation ε is uniform
across different levels of debiasing probability and/or discretization. In addition, observe that the
differences between the solid lines and dashed lines are similar for different levels of variation ε
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(a) Original SAT Scores (b) Debaised SAT Scores
Figure 12 Distribution of SAT scores
cross four different colors (i.e., four different set of experiments with different combination of low or
high debiasing probability and small or large number of schools). This implies that the differences
between the theoretically optimal PAUC and the empirically optimal PAUC can be explained
mostly by the variation ε in the bias factor. In other words, varying debiasing probability and/or
varying the number of schools do not, in general, result in a notably different discrepancy between
the theoretically optimal solution and the empirically optimal solution.
Biased group is the majority. So far, we have been assuming p to be small. That is, we assume
the student group that is experiencing bias (i.e., G2 students) is the minority. It is interesting also
to consider the case where G2 students form a majority group, and analyze how bias in the system
affects students and schools differently. We summarize our findings in Figure 10 and Figure 11.
Again, middle-performing G2 students are the ones who are heavily penalized, although when p >
0.5, the overall magnitude of mistreatment faced by G2 students is smaller when compared to the
benefits G1 students receive, especially to the G1 students with lower potentials. The perspective
from schools’ point of view is similar to when p is small. That is, schools are not significantly
influenced by the bias in evaluation and thus do not have much incentives for a change.
6.2. NYC High Schools SAT Scores
Prior to March 2016, the SAT exam had three sections: mathematics, critical reading, and writing.
Each section is reported on a scale from 200 to 800. Although not exclusively, students’ performance
on the SAT exam is one of the factors considered by the college admission team. Due to the
universality of SAT scores, we will use SAT scores as a proxy for high school students’ potentials.
Moreover, since SAT scores follows a normal distribution, we can use data on SAT scores to study
our model empirically when the distribution of students’ potentials are assumed to be Gaussian.
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Figure 13 Displacement of students. Figure 14 Best intervention strategy.
The primary dataset we use is compiled by NYC Open Data and downloaded from Kaggle (2015).
The dataset contains information regarding high schools in New York City during the 2014–2015
academic year, including the average SAT score of each school, the number of SAT test takers from
each school. To simulate and mimic the SAT scores of high school students in New York City, we
further use distribution information, standard deviation to be specific, of SAT scores from a report
published by College Board (2016). In particular, for each test taker of a given high school, his or
her SAT score is drawn randomly from a normal distribution with mean being the reported school
average and standard deviation obtained from the College Board report. Since SAT scores cannot
be lower than 600, nor higher than 2400, we truncated those simulated scores which are outside
the standard range.
In order to distinguish between G1 students and G2 students, we make use of another dataset
from NYC Open Data (2017). The dataset contains the Economic Need of each school, measured
as the Economic Need Index (ENI), which is a numeric value between 0 and 1 and is used to
determine the likelihood that students at the school are in poverty (NYCDOE 2017). Using the
median of the ENI as a cutoff point, we deem students from schools whose ENI is higher than
the median as G2 students and the rest as G1 students. Hence, the proportion of G2 students is
p= 0.50.
In Figure 12a, we plot the distribution of SAT scores for both G1 and G2 students. One can see
that systematically, the SAT scores of G2 students are lower than those of G1 students. When we
scale up G2 students’ SAT score by a factor of 1.25, the distribution of SAT scores of the two groups
are quite similar in distribution (Figure 12b). This let us estimate the bias factor β to be roughly
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Figure 15 Incentives of conducting interview under normally distributed potentials
1
1.25
= 0.8 and we will fix β = 0.8 for the following analysis. In addition, we assume students’ true
potentials follow a normal distribution with mean 1,550 and standard deviation 310. The mean
and standard deviation are estimated from the simulated data.
The displacement of students is shown in Figure 13. As in Figure 1b, the green dotted line rep-
resents the place students should be placed when there is no bias in the system. Displacement for
all G1 students is non-positive and that for all G2 is non-negative. Since p= 0.5, the benefits expe-
rienced by G1 students are quite symmetric to the mistreatments experienced by G2 students. The
deviation of blue and magenta lines from the green dotted line is quite significant, suggesting the
necessity of bias-mitigating interventions. Again, we will consider two such strategies: interviewing
and vouchers.
A figure similar to Figure 2 is shown in Figure 15 to demonstrate the impact of bias from
schools’ perspective for the setting of normally distributed potentials. The utilities of schools in the
unbiased setting, uµ(s), and the utilities of schools in the biased setting, uµ̂(s) are not distinctly
different. Thus, similarly, bias in the system do not impact schools as significantly as it does for
students. In terms of schools’ incentive to conduct interview, again similar to the case of Pareto
distribution, although if only one school decides to interview, it has a huge gain in utility, when
all schools interview (and interview the same amount of students), the gain of individual school
becomes smaller and is longer considerable.
In terms of intervention, using grid search, for each of the two measures of unfairness (recall, most
significant mistreatment and average mistreatment), we can obtain the empirically optimal interval
of potentials of G2 students to debias. Assume the amount of vouchers ĉ= 0.30, the resulting two
measures of unfairness under different debiasing intervals are summarized in Table 3. The first row
of the table is the baseline when no intervention measure is taken. The best interval under the
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Intervention Range PAUC Maximum Mistreatment
∅ 0.4238 0.3216
[−∞,1387] 0.3022 0.2415
[1229,1511] 0.2934 0.3165
[1387,1629] 0.2645 0.3619
[1511,1759] 0.2228 0.3644
[1695,2187] 0.1658 0.2302
[1700,2231] 0.1657 0.2078
[1713,∞] 0.1684 0.2095
Table 3 PAUC and maximum mistreatment under different intervention range.
two measures of unfairness coincide for the experimented setting (although in general, we do not
expect this to be true). In particular, vouchers should be offered to the middle top students. The
mistreatment of G2 students before and after intervention on the empirically optimal interval G2
students is illustrated in Figure 14.
7. Conclusions
Our key qualitative takeaways are important and speak to a much ingrained systemic problem that
limits access to opportunities – how can one understand the impact of bias on societal practices
and systematically account for biases in the real world. Indeed, resources available for meaningful
interventions in an existing system are limited, and there is resistance to change: for instance,
a 2019 plan supported by New York City’s mayor to eliminate the entrance exam to top public
high schools has failed to gain enough support, and was not approved by the New York State
government (Shapiro and Wang 2019). Thus, our focus is on understanding the impact of minimally
invasive use of targeted resources, as opposed to changing the matching mechanism itself. From
our analysis, we are able to highlight the following qualitative properties using simple models of
bias and matching mechanism:
1. Disparate Impact: The disparity in admissions is experienced much more by the group of
students who face biases and stereotypes, compared to the marginal advantage of students from
the non-stereotyped group.
2. Interventions: Decentralized interventions at the individual-school level are not as impactful
from schools’ perspective and thus schools have little incentive for change.
3. Resources: Centralized debiasing interventions are meaningful tools to address the disparity.
Which students should be the target of those interventions depend on the assumption on the
distribution of student potentials and not the measure of fairness under consideration. The optimal
set of students to target oscillates between the average students (in the case of Pareto distribution)
and average-top students (in the case of Gaussian distribution). Hence, in settings where we can
assume that the student potential is indeed Pareto distributed (e.g., applicants to schools with
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a focus on a specific curriculum), our findings support the idea of allocating vouchers to average
students, rather than to top students.
These takeaways are a first step, and in no way address all the systemic problems in school
admission process – such as access to counselors, transport to schools or familial support towards
education. But it does help us understand the most impacted student groups, and provide a math-
ematical basis to the public policy communities to debate existing scholarship mechanisms.
Future work include further relaxations of the assumptions, such assuming that students have
slightly different rankings of schools, investigation on different distributions of students’ poten-
tials, as well as debiasing mechanisms that satisfy individual fairness (see the discussion at the
end of Section 4.2). Moreover, although our exposition in this paper is focused on school-student
matchings, it would be interesting to apply and extend these results to two-sided markets in other
domains as well. For instance, in ride-sharing systems like Uber and Lyft, there is evidence of bias
in the ratings of drivers (e.g., socioeconomic status is often correlated to the conditions of the car
or the accents that people speak in) (Rosenblat et al. 2017). These ratings guide the quality and
frequency of matches to riders among drivers within a bounded radius of a new ride request (Cook
2015). Our approach could then shed light on how matching platforms (e.g., Uber, Lyft) themselves
might target certain drivers and debias their ratings, by possibly using a neutral evaluator.
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Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1 and related facts
The analysis we give is actually more general, and has the goal of investigating conditions under which
giving vouchers can improve over the status quo. More formally, for bounded functions f, g : G2→ R, we
write f  g if we can partition G2 in two sets S,S′ (with possibly S′ = ∅) so that f(θ) = g(θ) for θ ∈ S′ and
supθ∈S f(θ)> supθ∈S g(θ). Note that is transitive and antisymmetric, and can be interpreted as a continuous
equivalent of the classical lexicographic ordering for discrete vectors. In particular, if we let f = γ − µ and
g = γ′ − µ for matchings γ, γ′, then supθ∈G2(γ − µ)(θ)> supθ∈G2(γ′ − µ)(θ) implies f  g (taking S =G2).
Now suppose we debias student in T = [Z1,Z2] for some T ∈ T (ĉ), and let f := µ̂− µ, g := µT − µ. Table 4
provides conditions under which f  g (i.e., intervention reduces the maximum mistreated experienced by G2
students). In particular it shows that for certain combinations of the data and the choice of Z1 and Z2, giving
vouchers may actually lead to worse (according to ) matchings. One can check that under assumption (3),
all conditions given in Table 4 for different cases are satisfied.
CASE subcase condition for µ̂−µ µT −µ
I. βZ2 ≥Z1 1. 1≤ βZ1 p < 1−
(
Z1
Z2
)α
2. βZ1 ≤ 1≤ βZ2 p < 1−
(
1
βZ2
)α
II. βZ2 ≤Z1
1. 1≤ βZ1 p < 1−βα
2. βZ1 ≤ 1≤ βZ2 p
((
1
Z1
)α
−
(
1
Z2
)α)
< (1− p)
(
1
βα
− 1
)(
βα−
(
1
Z2
)α)
3. βZ2 ≤ 1 Not possible: g f in this case.
Table 4 Sufficient conditions for µ̂−µ µT −µ by cases, where T = [Z1,Z2]. Each strict inequality, when
replaced with its non-strict counterpart, gives instead a necessary condition.
In this first part of the proof, we proceed as follows. First, we assume that T ∈ T c(ĉ). That is, we assume
T = [Z1,Z2] with extreme points Z1 <Z2. For simplicity, we let µ˜ denote µT . We then compare f := µ̂− µ
and g := µ˜−µ using the relation .
Note that, if we let S be the set of students in G2 with potential in [Z1,Z2/β] and S
′ :=G2 \S, we have
f(θ) = g(θ) for θ ∈ S′. That is, only G2 students whose true potential lies in interval [Z1,Z2/β] are affected
by the intervention. Hence, supθ∈S f > supθ∈S g if and only if f  g.
We divide the analysis in the following two major cases: the first case is when βZ2 ≥ Z1 (i.e., when
[βZ1, βZ2] and [Z1,Z2] overlap) and the second case is when βZ2 ≤Z1. For both major cases, we will consider
two subcases: βZ1 ≥ 1, βZ1 ≤ 1≤ βZ2. And for the second major case, we also need to consider the subcase
where βZ2 ≤ 1. The results for all cases are summarized in the Table 4.
A.1. CASE I: βZ2 ≥Z1
The dashed lines represent perceived potential equaling to 1, and the two dashed lines represent the two
subcases we will consider.
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Z1
βZ1
Z2
βZ2
1 2
Subcase 1. 1≤ βZ1. Under the status quo µ̂, the student in S that is most unfairly treated is the one whose
true potential is Z1. This can be easily observed from Figure 1a. Thus,
sup
θ∈S
{(µ̂−µ)(θ)}= (1− p)
(
1
Z1
)α(
1
βα
− 1
)
. (4)
Now, for the ranking µ˜ after voucher correction, G2 students whose true potentials are within [Z1,Z2] (i.e.,
those whose true potentials are revealed through vouchers) are not harmed under µ˜. That is, for all G2
student θ such that Z(θ) ∈ [Z1,Z2], we have (µ˜− µ)(θ)≤ 0, with equality achieved for G2 students whose
true potentials are in [Z1, βZ2]. Thus, the G2 student who experience the maximum mistreatment must have
potential in the interval [Z2,Z2/β]. In particular, for every G2 student θ ∈ S, we have
µ˜(θ) = pF¯2(βZ(θ)) + (1− p)F¯1(βZ(θ)) + p(F¯2(β2Z(θ))− F¯2(βZ2)),
where the three components correspond to G2 students with better perceived potentials even before the
intervention, G1 students with better perceived potentials, and additional G2 students with better perceived
potentials after after the intervention. Thus, for θ ∈ S,
(µ˜−µ)(θ) = p
(
1
Z(θ)
)α
+ (1− p)
(
1
βZ(θ)
)α
+ p
((
1
βZ(θ)
)α
−
(
1
Z2
)α)
−
(
1
Z(θ)
)α
=
(
1
Z(θ)
)α(
p+
1
βα
− 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−p
(
1
Z2
)α
.
Thus, the supremum is achieved for θ¯ ∈G2 such that Z(θ¯) =Z2. That is,
sup
θ∈S
{(µ˜−µ)(θ)}= (µ˜−µ)(θ¯) =
(
1
βα
− 1
)(
1
Z2
)α
, (5)
and f  g if
(1− p)
(
1
Z1
)α(
1
βα
− 1
)
>
(
1
βα
− 1
)(
1
Z2
)α
⇔ p < 1−
(
Z1
Z2
)α
.
See Figure 16 for a comparison of µ˜−µ and µ̂−µ under this subcase. Two subfigures have different values
of p. When p= 0.40 (left), voucher correction decreases the maximum mistreatment (i.e., f  g). However,
when p= 0.70 (right), voucher correction actually increases the maximum mistreatment experienced by G2
students (i.e., g f).
Subcase 2. βZ1 ≤ 1 ≤ βZ2. Before the correction, the G2 student that is mistreated the most is the one
whose perceived potential is 1 (i.e., true potential is 1/β). That is,
sup
θ∈S
{(µ̂−µ)(θ)}= (µ̂−µ)
(
1
β
)
= (1− p) (1−βα) . (6)
Note that Z1 ≥ 1 since Z1 denotes the true potential. Thus, it is not hard to see that the previous analysis
remains valid. In particular, equation (5) holds. Therefore, f  g if
(1− p)(1−βα)>
(
1
βα
− 1
)(
1
Z2
)α
⇔ p < 1−
(
1
βZ2
)α
.
See Figure 17 for a demonstration of scenarios under this case. Similarly, two subfigures are presented,
one for when f  g and one for when g f .
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(a) when correction is better in the affected region (b) when correction is worse in the affected region
Figure 16 Mistreatment of G2 student before and after voucher correction for CASE I-1.
(a) when correction is better in the affected region (b) when correction is worse in the affected region
Figure 17 Mistreatment of G2 student before and after voucher correction for CASE I-2.
A.2. CASE II: βZ2 ≤Z1
Z1
βZ1
Z2
βZ2
1 2 3
As in the previous case, the dashed lines represent perceived potential equaling to 1, and three dashed lines
represent the three different subcases we will consider. Note that besides the two cases in the previous case,
we also have a third additional case to consider.
Subcase 1. 1 ≤ βZ1. Equation (4) holds for µ̂− µ. And as for the matching µ˜ after voucher correction,
with the same argument, it is clear that supθ∈S{(µ˜ − µ)(θ)} is achieved for some θ ∈ G2 with Z(θ) ∈
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(a) when correction is better in the affected region (b) when correction is worse in the affected region
Figure 18 Mistreatment of G2 student before and after voucher correction for CASE II-1.
[Z2,Z2/β]. However, to have a complete analysis, we need to consider the following two ranges, [Z2,Z1/β]
and [Z1/β,Z2/β], separately as the expressions for µ˜(θ) differ.
First Range [Z1/β,Z2/β]. Here, µ˜ has the same expression as in case I.1 and thus the supremum of µ˜−µ
in this range is achieved at θ¯ ∈ S such that Z(θ¯) =Z1/β.
sup
θ∈S:Z(θ)∈[Z1/β,Z2/β]
{(µ˜−µ)(θ)}= (µ˜−µ)(θ¯).
Second Range [Z2,Z1/β]. In this range, we have
µ˜(θ) = pF¯2(βZ(θ)) + (1− p)F¯1(βZ(θ)) + p
(
F¯2(Z1)− F¯2(Z2)
)
and
(µ˜−µ)(θ) = p
(
1
Z(θ)
)α
+ (1− p)
(
1
βZ(θ)
)α
+ p
((
1
Z1
)α
−
(
1
Z2
)α)
−
(
1
Z(θ)
)α
=
(
1
Z(θ)
)α
(1− p)
(
1
βα
− 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+p
((
1
Z1
)α
−
(
1
Z2
)α)
.
Thus, the supremum of µ˜−µ in this range is achieved at θ ∈ S such that Z(θ) =Z2.
sup
θ∈S:Z(θ)∈[Z2,Z1/β]
{(µ˜−µ)(θ)}= (µ˜−µ)(θ).
All together, since µ˜−µ is continuous, we have
sup
θ∈S
{(µ˜−µ)(θ)}= (µ˜−µ)(θ) = p
(
1
Z1
)α
+
(
1
Z2
)α(
(1− p) 1
βα
− 1
)
, (7)
and thus, f  g if
(1− p)
(
1
Z1
)α(
1
βα
− 1
)
> p
(
1
Z1
)α
+
(
1
Z2
)α(
(1− p) 1
βα
− 1
)
⇔ p < 1−βα.
Voucher correction under this cases is shown in Figure 18.
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(a) when correction is better in the affected region (b) when correction is worse in the affected region
Figure 19 Mistreatment of G2 student before and after voucher correction for CASE II-2.
Subcase 2. βZ1 ≤ 1≤ βZ2. As in case II.2, Equation (6) holds. The analysis for µ˜−µ is the same as in the
previous section and equation (7) is valid. Thus, f  g if
(1− p)
(
1
Z1
)α(
1
βα
− 1
)
> p
(
1
Z1
)α
+
(
1
Z2
)α(
(1− p) 1
βα
− 1
)
⇔
p
((
1
Z1
)α
−
(
1
Z2
)α)
< (1− p)
(
1
βα
− 1
)(
βα−
(
1
Z2
)α)
.
See Figure 19 for a demonstration of this subcase.
Subcase 3. βZ2 ≤ 1. Again, we can refer to Equation (6) for supθ∈S{(µ̂−µ)(θ)}. For voucher correction, as
in case II.1, supθ∈S{(µ˜−µ)(θ)} is obtained for some θ with Z(θ)∈ [Z2,Z2/β]. To have a complete analysis,
we consider three ranges, [Z2,1/β], [1/β,Z1/β] and [Z1/β,Z2/β], separately as the expressions for µ˜ differ,
the same reason as before.
First Range [Z1/β,Z2/β]. In this range, µ˜ has the same expression as in case I.1. Thus, the supremum of
µ˜−µ in this range is achieved at θ¯ ∈ S such that Z(θ¯) =Z1/β. That is,
sup
θ∈S:Z(θ)∈[Z1/β,Z2/β]
{(µ˜−µ)(θ)}= (µ˜−µ)(θ¯).
Second Range [1/β,Z1/β]. The analysis here is the same as that of the second range in Case II.1. Therefore,
the supremum of µ˜−µ in this range is achieved at θ ∈ S such that Z(θ) = 1/β. That is,
sup
θ∈S:Z(θ)∈[1/β,Z1/β]
{(µ˜−µ)(θ)}= (µ˜−µ)(θ).
Third Range [Z2,1/β]. Lastly, for this range, we have
µ˜(θ) = pF¯2(βZ(θ)) + (1− p) + p
(
F¯2(Z1)− F¯2(Z2)
)
and
(µ˜−µ)(θ) = p
(
1
Z(θ)
)α
+ (1− p) + p
((
1
Z1
)α
−
(
1
Z2
)α)
−
(
1
Z(θ)
)α
=
(
1
Z(θ)
)α
(p− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+(1− p) + p
((
1
Z1
)α
−
(
1
Z2
)α)
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(a) correction is worse in affected region w/ small p (b) correction is worse in affected region w/ large p
Figure 20 Mistreatment of G2 student before and after voucher correction for CASE II-3.
Thus,
sup
θ∈S:Z(θ)∈[Z2,1/β]
{(µ˜−µ)(θ)}= (µ˜−µ)(θ).
All together, by continuity of µ˜−µ, we have
sup
θ∈S
{(µ˜−µ)(θ)}= (µ˜−µ)(θ) = (1− p)(1−βα) + p
((
1
Z1
)α
−
(
1
Z2
)α)
Hence, f  g only if
(1− p)(1−βα)≥ (1− p)(1−βα) + p
((
1
Z1
)α
−
(
1
Z2
)α)
.
However, this is impossible since Z1 <Z2. Hence, we always have g  f in this case, as shown in Figure 20
with two different values of p.
A.3. Computing the optimal range for vouchers
We now prove Theorem 1 under the additional restriction that sets in T (ĉ) are connected, i.e., of the form
[Z1,Z2] (we shall show later that this condition can be relaxed).
Observation 3. If there is an interval [Z1,Z2] that is of either case I.2 or case II.2 such that µ[Z1,Z2]−µ≺
µ̂−µ with S =G2, then the optimal range must be of case I.2 or case II.2. This is because for any interval
[Z ′1,Z
′
2] that is not of case I.2 or case II.2, we have
sup
θ∈Θ
{(µ[Z′1,Z′2]−µ)} ≥ sup
θ∈Θ
{µ̂−µ}> sup
θ∈Θ
{µ[Z1,Z2]−µ}.
As it turns out, indeed, the optimal range will be either case I.2 or case II.2, and exactly which one the
optimal solution is depends on the amount of resources, i.e., the magnitude of ĉ.
We now show the first half of Theorem 1, i.e., we assume ĉ≥ (1−p)(1−βα)
1−p+1−βα . We proceed as follows:
(1). We first show that [Z∗1 ,Z
∗
2 ] is of case I.2. That is, we show βZ
∗
2 ≥Z∗1 and Z∗1 ≤ 1β ≤Z∗2 .
From the analysis in Section A.1 and Section A.2, one can see that for an interval [Z1,Z2] of case I.2 or
case II.2, µ[Z1,Z2]−µ increases on [1,Z1], deceases on [Z2,∞], and it is non-positive on [Z1,Z2]. This means
supθ∈Θ{µ[Z1,Z2]−µ} is achieved either at Z1 or Z2.
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(2). Next, we show that [Z∗1 ,Z
∗
2 ] is an exact range, that is, (
1
Z∗1
)α − ( 1
Z∗2
)α = ĉ. Moreover, let θ∗1 and θ
∗
2
be the G2 students whose potentials are Z
∗
1 and Z
∗
2 respectively. Then, (µ[Z1,Z2]−µ)(θ∗1) = (µ[Z1,Z2]−µ)(θ∗2)
and therefore, they are both equal to supθ∈Θ{µ[Z1,Z2]−µ}.
Together with assumption (3), we have supθ∈Θ{µ[Z∗1 ,Z∗2 ]−µ} ≤ supθ∈Θ{µ̂−µ}. Thus, due to Observation 3,
it is sufficient to compare [Z∗1 ,Z
∗
2 ] only with intervals [Z1,Z2] of case I.2 and case II.2 (i.e, when βZ1 ≤ 1≤
βZ2). Since [Z
∗
1 ,Z
∗
2 ] is exact, we must either have Z1 >Z
∗
1 or Z2 <Z
∗
2 .
(3). Lastly, we show that for any other feasible range [Z1,Z2] of case I.2 or case II.2, we must have
supθ∈Θ{µ[Z1,Z2]−µ}> supθ∈Θ{µ[Z∗1 ,Z∗2 ]−µ}. Let θ1 and θ2 be the G2 students whose potentials are Z1 and
Z2. It suffices to show
i). if Z1 >Z
∗
1 , then (µ[Z1,Z2]−µ)(θ1)> (µ[Z∗1 ,Z∗2 ]−µ)(θ∗1);
ii). if Z2 <Z
∗
2 , then (µ[Z1,Z2]−µ)(θ2)> (µ[Z∗1 ,Z∗2 ]−µ)(θ∗2).
STEP (1). We start by showing βZ∗2 ≥Z∗1 through a sequence of equivalence relations:
βZ∗2 ≥Z∗1 ⇔
(
1
βZ∗2
)α
≤
(
1
Z∗1
)α
⇔ 1
βα
(1− p)(1− ĉ)≤ (1− p) +
(
1
βα
− 1
)
ĉ
⇔ ĉ(1−βα + 1− p)≥ (1− p)(1−βα).
Note that the last inequality is implied by the condition we have on ĉ. We next show Z∗1 ≤ 1β :
Z∗1 ≤
1
β
⇔ (βZ∗1)α ≤ 1 ⇔ βα ·
1
βα
− p
(1− p) + ( 1
βα
− 1)ĉ ≤ 1 ⇔ ĉ≥ pβ
α.
To show ĉ≥ pβα, it suffices to show that (1−p)(1−βα)
1−p+1−βα ≥ pβα because of the condition we assumed on ĉ. Let
a := 1− p and b := 1−βα. Note that a, b≤ 1 and a+ b= 1− p+ 1−βα ≥ 1− p+ p= 1. Hence, essentially we
want to show that if a, b≤ 1 and a+ b≥ 1, we must have
ab
a+ b
≥ (1− a)(1− b).
Indeed, this is true because
ab
a+ b
≥ (1− a)(1− b)⇔ ab≥ (a+ b)(1− (a+ b) + ab)
⇔ ab≥ (a+ b)(1− (a+ b)) + (a+ b)ab
⇔ ab(1− (a+ b))≥ (a+ b)(1− (a+ b)).
When a+ b= 1, this is clearly true as both sides equal to 0. When a+ b > 1, this is equivalent to ab≤ a+ b,
which is also clearly true since ab≤ 1.
Lastly, we show Z∗2 ≥ 1β . That is, we want to show (βZ2)α ≥ 1. Plugging in the value of Z∗2 , we want to
show
(1− p)(1− ĉ)≤ 1−βαp⇔ ĉ(p− 1)≤ p(1−βα),
which is true simply because p− 1< 0 and 1−βα > 0.
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STEP (2). The claims follow simply after plugging in the values of Z∗1 and Z
∗
2 . First,
(
1
Z∗1
)α
−
(
1
Z∗2
)α
=
(1− p) +
(
1
βα
− 1
)
ĉ− (1− p)(1− ĉ)
1
βα
− p =
(
1
βα
− 1
)
ĉ+ (1− p)ĉ
1
βα
− p = ĉ.
Then, since Z∗1 <
1
β
, we have
(µ[Z∗1 ,Z∗2 ]−µ)(θ∗1) = (µ̂−µ)(θ∗1) = (1− p)
(
1−
(
1
Z∗1
)α)
.
For the other side, using the formula in Equation (5), we have
(µ[Z∗1 ,Z∗2 ]−µ)(θ∗2) =
(
1
βα
− 1
)(
1
Z∗2
)α
.
Therefore, we simply want to show
(1− p)
(
1−
(
1
Z∗1
)α)
=
(
1
βα
− 1
)(
1
Z∗2
)α
.
Plugging in the values, we have
LHS = (1− p)

(
1
βα
− 1
)
− ( 1
βα
− 1)ĉ
1
βα
− p
= (1− p)( 1βα − 1)(1− ĉ)1
βα
− p ,
RHS =
(
1
βα
− 1
)
(1− p)(1− ĉ)
1
βα
− p =LHS.
STEP (3.i). Note that (µ[Z1,Z2] − µ)(θ1) = (µ̂− µ)(θ1), (µ[Z∗1 ,Z∗2 ] − µ)(θ∗1) = (µ̂− µ)(θ∗1). Since Z1 < 1β , from
Figure 1a, it is clear that if Z1 >Z
∗
1 , we must have (µ̂−µ)(θ1)> (µ̂−µ)(θ∗1).
STEP (3.ii). Note that (µ[Z1,Z2] − µ)(θ2) =
(
1
βα
− 1
)(
1
Z2
)α
and (µ[Z∗1 ,Z∗2 ] − µ)(θ∗2) =
(
1
βα
− 1
)
( 1
Z∗2
)α. Since(
1
Z2
)α
> ( 1
Z∗2
)α by assumption, the claim follows clearly.
This concludes the case when ĉ ≥ 1−p
1−p+1−βα (1− βα). For the second half of the theorem, we will follow
similar steps and reasoning. Step (3) is essentially the same as before and is thus omitted. The first two steps
are outlined below.
(1). We first show that [Z∗1 ,Z
∗
2 ] is of case II.2. That is to show βZ
∗
2 ≤Z∗1 and Z∗1 ≤ 1β ≤Z∗2 .
(2). We check that [Z∗1 ,Z
∗
2 ] is an exact range. And let θ
∗
1 and θ
∗
2 be the G2 students whose potentials are
Z∗1 and Z
∗
2 respectively, we want to show that (µ[Z1,Z2]−µ)(θ∗1) = (µ[Z1,Z2]−µ)(θ∗2), which implies that both
are supθ∈Θ{µ[Z∗1 ,Z∗2 ]−µ}.
(3). We show µ[Z∗1 ,Z∗2 ]−µ≺ µ̂−µ, which, unlike in the previous case, is not immediate from (3).
Again, due to Observation 3, it is sufficient to compare [Z∗1 ,Z
∗
2 ] only with regions [Z1,Z2] of case I.2 and
case II.2 (i.e, when βZ1 ≤ 1≤ βZ2).
(4). As before, we will show two cases, which is enough because [Z∗1 ,Z
∗
2 ] is exact and one of the two cases
is bound to happen. Again, let θ1 and θ2 be the G2 students whose potentials are Z1 and Z2 respectively.
We want to show
i). if Z1 >Z
∗
1 , then (µ[Z1,Z2]−µ)(θ1)> (µ[Z∗1 ,Z∗2 ]−µ)(θ∗1),
ii). otherwise, we must have Z2 <Z
∗
2 , and then (µ[Z1,Z2]−µ)(θ2)> (µ[Z∗1 ,Z∗2 ]−µ)(θ∗2).
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STEP (1). We will start by showing βZ∗2 ≤Z∗1 . Note that
βZ∗2 ≤Z∗1 ⇔
(
1
βZ∗2
)α
≥
(
1
Z∗1
)α
⇔ 1
βα
((1− p− ĉ)βα + (1− p)ĉ)≥ (1− p− ĉ)βα
⇔ ĉ
(
1− 1− p
βα
−βα
)
≤ (1− p)(1−βα)
The last inequality is clearly true because under the assumption p ≤ 1 − βα we have 1−p
βα
≥ 1 and thus
1− 1−p
βα
−βα ≤−βα < 0. Next, we will show Z∗1 ≤ 1β ⇔ ( 1Z∗1 )
α ≥ βα. Indeed,(
1
Z∗1
)α
=
(1− p− ĉ)βα
1− p + ĉ= β
α +
(
1− β
α
1− p
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
ĉ≥ βα.
Lastly, we want to show Z∗2 ≥ 1β ⇔ ( 1Z∗2 )
α ≤ βα. Plugging in the formula of Z∗2 , we have(
1
Z∗2
)α
=
(1− p− ĉ)
1− p︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
βα = βα ≤ βα.
STEP (2). From the formula of Z∗1 and Z
∗
2 , it is clear that (
1
Z∗1
)α− ( 1
Z∗2
)α = ĉ and thus, [Z∗1 ,Z
∗
2 ] is an exact
range. For the second part, note that as in the previous case, since Z∗1 <
1
β
, we have
(µ[Z∗1 ,Z∗2 ]−µ)(θ∗1) = (µ̂−µ)(θ∗1) = (1− p)
(
1−
(
1
Z∗1
)α)
.
And for the other side, plugging in the formula in Equation (7), we have
(µ[Z∗1 ,Z∗2 ]−µ)(θ∗2) = p
(
1
Z∗1
)α
+
(
1
Z∗2
)α(
(1− p) 1
βα
− 1
)
.
Hence, it suffices to show that
(1− p)
(
1−
(
1
Z∗1
)α)
= p
(
1
Z∗1
)α
+
(
1
Z∗2
)α(
(1− p) 1
βα
− 1
)
m
1− p−
(
1
Z∗1
)α
=
(
1
Z∗2
)α(
(1− p) 1
βα
− 1
)
.
Plugging in the values of Z∗1 and Z
∗
2 , indeed, we have
LHS = 1− p− (1− p− ĉ)β
α
1− p − ĉ
RHS = (1− p− ĉ)− (1− p− ĉ)β
α
1− p =LHS.
STEP (3). To show µ[Z∗1 ,Z∗2 ]−µ≺ µ̂−µ, we want to use the condition given in Case II.2. That is, we want
to show
pĉ≤ (1− p)
(
1
βα
− 1
)(
βα−
(
1
Z∗2
)α)
.
Plugging in the formula for Z∗2 , we have
RHS = (1− p)
(
1
βα
− 1
)
βα
(
1− 1− p− ĉ
1− p
)
= (1− p) (1−βα) ĉ
1− p = (1−β
α)ĉ≥ pĉ.
STEP (4.i). This is exactly the same as in the previous case.
STEP (4.ii). In this case, we assume Zi <Z
∗
i for i= 1,2. Note that
(µ[Z1,Z2]−µ)(θ2) = p
(
1
Z1
)α
+
(
1
Z2
)α(
(1− p) 1
βα
− 1
)
,
(µ[Z∗1 ,Z∗2 ]−µ)(θ∗2) = p
(
1
Z∗1
)α
+
(
1
Z∗2
)α(
(1− p) 1
βα
− 1
)
,
and the claim follows directly under assumption (3) as it implies (1− p) 1
βα
− 1≥ 0.
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Figure 21 Plots of µT −µ for sets T constructed in Section A.4.
A.4. Optimality of [Z∗1 ,Z
∗
2 ]
Now let T ∗ ∈ T (ĉ) be the optimal solution without the restriction that sets in T (ĉ) are connected. We
will show that T ∗ differs from [Z∗1 ,Z
∗
2 ] in a set of measure zero. First, in order to have sup(µT∗ − µ) ≤
sup(µ[Z∗1 ,Z∗2 ]−µ) =: s, in T ∗, we must debias all students θ whose mistreatment (µ̂−µ)(θ) is greater than s.
That is, we must have T ∗1 := [Z
∗
1 ,Z
(1)]⊆ T ∗, where Z(1) :=Z(θ(1))≥ 1/β and (µ̂−µ)(θ(1)) = s. Geometrically,
this cuts off the peak of µ̂− µ in Figure 21. However, now, there is a G2 student θ(2) such that Z(2) :=
Z(θ(2))>Z(1) and (µT∗1 −µ)(θ(2)) = s (see Figure 21). We have moreover that (µT∗1 −µ)(θ)≥ s for all θ ∈G2
such that Z(θ)∈ [Z(1),Z(2)]. Thus, we must also have [Z(1),Z(2)]∈ T ∗. Let T ∗2 := [Z∗1 ,Z(2)]. We can repeat the
argument and observe that there is a G2 student θ
(3) such that Z(3) :=Z(θ(3))>Z(2) and (µT∗2 −µ)(θ)≥ s for
θ ∈G2 such that Z(θ)∈ [Z(2),Z(3)] and conclude that T ∗3 := [Z∗1 ,Z(3)] must be contained in T ∗. Continuously
applying the same argument, we have limn→∞Z(θ(n)) =Z∗2 and thus the claim follows.
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 2
Assume T = [Z1,Z2] is the range of true potentials of G2 students we want to debias. For simplicity, as in
previous sections, let µ˜ denote µT . In order to obtain the minimizer of σ(µ˜−µ), first, we want to compute
σ(µ˜−µ) for each of the cases in Section A. To start with, under the status quo, we have
σ(µ̂−µ) = (1− p)
(
1
βα
− 1
)∫ ∞
1
β
(
1
t
)α
α
tα+1
dt+ (1− p)
∫ 1
β
1
(
1−
(
1
t
)α)
α
tα+1
dt
= (1− p)
(
1
βα
− 1
)
1
2
(β2α− 0) + (1− p)
(
1−βα− 1
2
(1−β2α)
)
=
1
2
(1− p)(1−βα).
For 1≤ t1 ≤ t2 ∈R∪{+∞}, let
σt2t1 (f) :=
∫ t2
t1
max(f(t),0)dF1(t)
for any function f : [1,∞]→ [0,1]. When t1 = 1 and t2 =∞, we simply write σ(f), which is consistent with
previous notations. Note that with σ(µ̂−µ) as a reference, it actually suffices to compute only σZ2/βZ1 (µ˜−µ),
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because minimizing σ(µ˜−µ) is equivalent to maximizing σZ2/βZ1 (µ̂−µ)−σZ2/βZ1 (µ˜−µ) given that (µ̂−µ)(θ) =
(µ˜−µ)(θ) for all θ ∈G2 such that Z(θ) /∈ [Z1,Z2/β].
In addition to giving an explicit formula for σZ2/βZ1 (µ̂−µ)−σZ2/βZ1 (µ˜−µ) in each case, we also analyze how
this value changes (increase or decrease) with respect to Z1 and Z2.
B.1. CASE I: βZ2 ≥Z1
Subcase 1. 1 ≤ βZ1. To compute the PAUC, we need to express µ˜− µ for all θ with Z(θ) ∈ [1,∞) and
(µ˜− µ)(θ)> 0. In fact, all such pieces have been computed in the previous section. All pieces together, we
have
(µ˜−µ)(θ) =

(µ̂−µ)(θ) = (1− p)
(
1−
(
1
Z(θ)
)α)
> 0 if 1≤Z(θ)≤ 1
β
,
(µ̂−µ)(θ) = (1− p)
(
1
Z(θ)
)α(
1
βα
− 1
)
> 0 if 1
β
≤Z(θ)≤Z1,
0 if Z1 ≤Z(θ)≤ βZ2,
< 0 if βZ2 ≤Z(θ)≤Z2,(
1
Z(θ)
)α(
p+
1
βα
− 1
)
− p
(
1
Z2
)α
> 0 if Z2 ≤Z(θ)≤Z2/β,
(µ̂−µ)(θ) = (1− p)
(
1
Z(θ)
)α(
1
βα
− 1
)
> 0 if Z(θ)≥ βZ2.
The only necessary piece to integrate here is
σZ2/βZ2 (µ˜−µ) =
(
p+
1
βα
− 1
)∫ Z2/β
Z2
(
1
t
)α
α
tα+1
dt− p
(
1
Z2
)α ∫ Z2/β
Z2
α
tα+1
dt
=
(
p+
1
βα
− 1
)
1−β2α
2
(
1
Z2
)2α
− p
(
1
Z2
)2α
(1−βα).
Moreover, in this case, we have
σZ2/βZ1 (µ̂−µ) = (1− p)
(
1
βα
− 1
)∫ Z2/β
Z1
(
1
t
)α
α
tα+1
dt
= (1− p)
(
1
βα
− 1
)
1
2
((
1
Z1
)2α
−
(
β
Z2
)2α)
.
Thus,
σZ2/βZ1 (µ̂−µ)−σZ2/βZ1 (µ˜−µ) =
(1− p)
(
1
βα
− 1
)
2
(
1
Z1
)2α
+
p− pβα− 1
βα
+ 1
2
(
1
Z2
)2α
.
Now, to analyze how this quantity changes with Z1 and Z2, we first simplify some of the terms, which
will also be used in later sections. Let x= ( 1
Z2
)α ∈ [0,1] and let ( 1
Z1
)α = c+x∈ [0,1] for some c≤ ĉ. Also, let
g(x, c) := σZ2/βZ1 (µ̂−µ)−σZ2/βZ1 (µ˜−µ). Then,
g(x, c) =
(1− p)
(
1
βα
− 1
)
2
(c+x)2 +
p− pβα− 1
βα
+ 1
2
x2.
We want to show that g(x, c) increases as x increases (or equivalently, as Z2 decreases) and as c increases
(meaning that the constraint ( 1
Z1
)α− ( 1
Z2
)α ≤ ĉ is effectively ( 1
Z1
)α− ( 1
Z2
)α = ĉ). First,
∂g(x, c)
∂c
= (1− p)
(
1
βα
− 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
(c+x)≥ 0.
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Next, rearranging the terms, we have
g(x, c) =
p
2
(2− 1
βα
−βα)x2 + (1− p)
(
1
βα
− 1
)
cx+ const.
Let
h(c) :=−
(1− p)
(
1
βα
− 1
)
c
p(2− 1
βα
−βα)
be the peak of the parabola g(x, c). For each given c, we want to show that h(c) is always greater that the
maximum possible x in this case. If so, we have that g(x, c) is an increasing function of x. Since βZ2 ≥ Z1,
we have c= ( 1
Z1
)α− ( 1
Z2
)α ≥ ( 1
Z2
)α( 1
βα
− 1) = x( 1
βα
− 1). Thus, it is enough to show
(1− p)
(
1
βα
− 1
)2
p( 1
βα
+βα− 2) ≥ 1 ⇔ (1− p)
(
1
βα
− 1
)2
≥ p(1−βα)
(
1
βα
− 1
)
⇔ (1− p)
(
1
βα
− 1
)
≥ p(1−βα).
The last inequality is true because of the assumption that p < .5 and 1
βα
+βα− 2≥ 0.
Subcase 2. βZ1 ≤ 1≤ βZ2. The formula for µ˜−µ is similar to the previous case:
(µ˜−µ)(θ) =

(µ̂−µ)(θ) = (1− p)
(
1−
(
1
Z(θ)
)α)
> 0 if 1≤Z(θ)≤Z1,
0 if Z1 ≤Z(θ)≤ βZ2,
< 0 if βZ2 ≤Z(θ)≤Z2,(
1
Z(θ)
)α(
p+
1
βα
− 1
)
− p
(
1
Z2
)α
> 0 if Z2 ≤Z(θ)≤Z2/β,
(µ̂−µ)(θ) = (1− p)
(
1
Z(θ)
)α(
1
βα
− 1
)
> 0 if Z(θ)≥ βZ2.
However, here, for the status quo baseline, we have
σZ2/βZ1 (µ̂−µ) = (1− p)
(
1
βα
− 1
)∫ Z2/β
1/β
(
1
t
)α
α
tα+1
dt+ (1− p)
∫ 1/β
Z1
(
1−
(
1
t
)α)
α
tα+1
dt
=
(1− p)(βα−β2α)
2
(
1−
(
1
Z2
)2α)
+ (1− p)
[(
1
Z1
)α
−βα− 1
2
((
1
Z1
)2α
−β2α
)]
and thus,
σZ2/βZ1 (µ̂−µ)−σZ2/βZ1 (µ˜−µ) =−
1
2
(1− p)βα + (1− p)
((
1
Z1
)α
− 1
2
(
1
Z1
)2α)
+
p− pβα− 1
βα
+ 1
2
(
1
Z2
)2α
.
Now, for the analysis, similarly, write
g(x, c) = const + (1− p)
(
(c+x)− 1
2
(c+x)2
)
+
p− pβα− 1
βα
+ 1
2
x2.
Then,
∂g(x, c)
∂c
= (1− p)(1− (c+x))≥ 0
and rearranging the terms, we have
g(x, c) =
2p− pβα− 1
βα
2
x2 + (1− p)(1− c)x+ const.
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We will show that 2p− pβα− 1
βα
≤ 0 by showing βαp(2−βα)≤ 1. This is true under assumption (3), which
is p≤ 1−βα, because
βαp(2−βα)≤ βα(1−βα)(2−βα)≤ 1,
where the last inequality is due to the fact that βα ≤ 1. Hence, let
hI(c) =
(1− p)(1− c)
pβα + 1
βα
− 2p ,
then g(x, c) is an increasing function w.r.t. x on [0, hI(c)] and is a decreasing function on [hI(c),1].
B.2. CASE II: βZ2 ≤Z1
Subcase 1. 1≤ βZ1. Again, we want to express µ˜−µ for all θ such that Z(θ) ∈ [1,∞) and (µ˜−µ)(θ)> 0.
All pieces together, we have
(µ˜−µ)(θ) =

(µ̂−µ)(θ) = (1− p)
(
1−
(
1
Z(θ)
)α)
if 1≤Z(θ)≤ 1
β
,
(µ̂−µ)(θ) = (1− p)
(
1
Z(θ)
)α(
1
βα
− 1
)
if 1
β
≤Z(θ)≤Z1,
< 0 if Z1 ≤Z(θ)≤Z2,(
1
Z(θ)
)α
(1− p)
(
1
βα
− 1
)
+ p
((
1
Z1
)α
−
(
1
Z2
)α)
if Z2 ≤Z(θ)≤Z1/β,(
1
Z(θ)
)α(
p+
1
βα
− 1
)
− p
(
1
Z2
)α
if Z1/β ≤Z(θ)≤Z2/β,
(µ̂−µ)(θ) = (1− p)
(
1
Z(θ)
)α(
1
βα
− 1
)
> 0 if Z(θ)≥ βZ2.
As subcase 1. of Section B.1, for µ̂−µ, we have
σZ2/βZ1 (µ̂−µ) = (1− p)
(
1
βα
− 1
)
1
2
((
1
Z1
)2α
−
(
β
Z2
)2α)
,
and for µ˜−µ, we need to compute the integral of the following two pieces.
σZ1/βZ2 (µ˜−µ) = (1− p)
(
1
βα
− 1
)∫ Z1/β
Z2
(
1
t
)α
α
tα+1
dt+ p
((
1
Z1
)α
−
(
1
Z2
)α)∫ Z1/β
Z2
α
tα+1
dt
=
(1− p)
(
1
βα
− 1
)
2
((
1
Z2
)2α
− ( β
Z1
)2α
)
+ p
((
1
Z1
)α
−
(
1
Z2
)α)((
1
Z2
)α
−
(
β
Z1
)α)
;
σZ2/βZ1/β (µ˜−µ) =
(
p+
1
βα
− 1
)∫ Z2/β
Z1/β
(
1
t
)α
α
tα+1
dt− p
(
1
Z2
)α ∫ Z2/β
Z1/β
α
tα+1
dt
=
(
p+ 1
βα
− 1
)
β2α
2
((
1
Z1
)2α
−
(
1
Z2
)2α)
− pβα
(
1
Z2
)α((
1
Z1
)α
−
(
1
Z2
)α)
.
Hence,
σZ2/βZ1 (µ̂−µ)−σZ2/βZ1 (µ˜−µ) =
(
1
Z1
)2α (1− p)
(
1
βα
− 1
)
+ pβα
2

−
(
1
Z2
)2α (1− p)
(
1
βα
− 1
)
+ pβα
2

+ p
(
1
Z2
)2α
− p
(
1
Z1
)α(
1
Z2
)α
.
45
Now, for the analysis, let A= [(1− p)( 1
βα
− 1) + pβα]/2≥ 0. Then,
g(x, c) =A(c+x)2−Ax2 + px2− p(c+x)(x).
First, we have
∂g(x, c)
∂c
= 2A(c+x)− px= 2Ac+ (2A− p)x.
Under the assumption that 1− p > βα, we have 2A− p≥ βα( 1
βα
− 1) + pβα + βα − 1 = pβα ≥ 0. Therefore,
∂g(x,c)
∂c
≥ 0. Next, rearranging the terms, we have
g(x, c) = c(2A− p)x+ const,
and thus, g(x, c) is an increasing function on x.
Subcase 2. βZ1 ≤ 1≤ βZ2. Similar to the previous case, the formula for µ˜−µ is as follows:
(µ˜−µ)(θ) =

(µ̂−µ)(θ) = (1− p)
(
1−
(
1
Z(θ)
)α)
if 1≤Z(θ)≤Z1,
< 0 if Z1 ≤Z(θ)≤Z2,(
1
Z(θ)
)α
(1− p)
(
1
βα
− 1
)
+ p
((
1
Z1
)α
−
(
1
Z2
)α)
if Z2 ≤Z(θ)≤Z1/β,(
1
Z(θ)
)α(
p+
1
βα
− 1
)
− p
(
1
Z2
)α
if Z1/β ≤Z(θ)≤Z2/β,
(µ̂−µ)(θ) = (1− p)
(
1
Z(θ)
)α(
1
βα
− 1
)
> 0 if Z(θ)≥ βZ2.
Same as subcase 2. of Section B.1, we have
σZ2/βZ1 (µ̂−µ) =
(1− p)(βα−β2α)
2
(
1−
(
1
Z2
)2α)
+ (1− p)
[(
1
Z1
)α
−βα− 1
2
((
1
Z1
)2α
−β2α
)]
.
Note the components of interest for µ˜−µ have the same expression as in the previous section. Thus, using
the expression for the integrals from before, we have
σZ2/βZ1 (µ̂−µ)−σZ2/βZ1 (µ˜−µ) =−
1
2
(1− p)βα +
(
1
Z1
)2α(−(1− p) + pβα
2
)
+ (1− p)
(
1
Z1
)α
−
(
1
Z2
)2α( (1− p)( 1
βα
− 1
)
+ pβα
2
)
+ p
(
1
Z2
)2α
− p
(
1
Z1
)α(
1
Z2
)α
.
For the analysis, again let A= [(1− p)( 1
βα
− 1) + pβα]/2≥ 0 and B = [−(1− p) + pβα]/2. Since p < .5, we
have B ≤ 0. Then, we can write
g(x, c) = const +B(c+x)2 + (1− p)(c+x)−Ax2 + px2− p(c+x)(x).
First, we have
∂g(x, c)
∂c
= 2B(c+x) + (1− p)− px= (−(1− p) + pβα)(c+x) + [(1− p)− px].
Since x= ( 1
Z2
)α ≤ βα, we have [(1− p)− px]≥ (1− p)− pβα and thus, together with the fact that c+x≤ 1,
we have
∂g(x, c)
∂c
≥ ((1− p)− pβα)(1− (c+x))≥ 0.
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Next, after rearranging the terms, we have
g(x, c) = (B−A)x2 + [2Bc+ (1− p)− pc]x+ const
=
−(1− p) 1
βα
2
x2 +
[
(pβα− 1)c+ (1− p)]x+ const.
We will show that in this case, we must have
[
(pβα−1)c+ (1−p)]≥ 0. First, note that since βZ2 ≤Z1, and
Z2 ≥ 1β , we have
c=
(
1
Z1
)α
−
(
1
Z2
)α
≤
(
1
βα
− 1
)(
1
Z2
)α
≤
(
1
βα
− 1
)
βα = 1−βα.
Thus, to show
[
(pβα− 1)c+ (1− p)]≥ 0, it is enough to show that [(pβα− 1)(1− βα) + (1− p)]≥ 0, which
is equivalent to p(βα(1− βα)− 1) + βα ≥ 0. Under the assumption that p < 1− βα and with the fact that
βα(1−βα)− 1≤ 0, we have
p(βα(1−βα)− 1) +βα ≥ (1−βα)(βα(1−βα)− 1) +βα = (βα)3− 2(βα)2 + 3βα− 1≥ 0,
where the last inequality is because f(t) := t3− 2t2 + 3t− 1 is nonnegative when t≥ 0. Now, let
hII(c) =
(pβα− 1)c+ (1− p)
(1− p) 1
βα
,
then g(x, c) is an increasing function on [0, hII(c)] and is a decreasing function on [hII(c),1].
Subcase 3. βZ2 ≤ 1. Again, we want to express µ˜−µ for all θ such that Z(θ) ∈ [1,∞) and (µ˜−µ)(θ)≥ 0.
Combining all pieces, we have
(µ˜−µ)(θ) =

(µ̂−µ)(θ) = (1− p)
(
1−
(
1
Z(θ)
)α)
if 1≤Z(θ)≤Z1,
≤ 0 if Z1 ≤Z(θ)≤Z2,
(1− p)
(
1−
(
1
Z(θ)
)α)
+ p
((
1
Z1
)α
−
(
1
Z2
)α)
if Z2 ≤Z(θ)≤ 1/β,(
1
Z(θ)
)α
(1− p)
(
1
βα
− 1
)
+ p
((
1
Z1
)α
−
(
1
Z2
)α)
if 1/β ≤Z(θ)≤Z1/β,(
1
Z(θ)
)α(
p+
1
βα
− 1
)
− p
(
1
Z2
)α
if Z1/β ≤Z(θ)≤Z2/β,
(µ̂−µ)(θ) = (1− p)
(
1
Z(θ)
)α(
1
βα
− 1
)
> 0 if Z(θ)≥ βZ2.
For µ̂−µ, as in subcase 2, we have
σZ2/βZ1 (µ̂−µ) =
(1− p)(βα−β2α)
2
(
1−
(
1
Z2
)2α)
+ (1− p)
[(
1
Z1
)α
−βα− 1
2
((
1
Z1
)2α
−β2α
)]
.
For µ˜−µ, the component of θ ∈ [Z1/β,Z2/β] is the same as in subcase 1 of this section, which is
σZ2/βZ1/β (µ˜−µ) =
(
p+ 1
βα
− 1
)
β2α
2
((
1
Z1
)2α
−
(
1
Z2
)2α)
− pβα
(
1
Z2
)α((
1
Z1
)α
−
(
1
Z2
)α)
,
and we only have to integrate the other two components:
σ1/βZ2 (µ˜−µ) = (1− p)
∫ 1/β
Z2
(
1−
(
1
t
)α)
α
tα+1
dt+ p
((
1
Z1
)α
−
(
1
Z2
)α)∫ 1/β
Z2
α
tα+1
dt
= (1− p)
[(
1
Z2
)α
−βα− 1
2
(( 1
Z2
)2α
−β2α)]+ p(( 1
Z1
)α
−
(
1
Z2
)α)((
1
Z2
)α
−βα
)
;
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Figure 22 Change in type of [Z1,Z2] as Z1 increases given (
1
Z1
)α− ( 1
Z2
)α = ĉ and fixed parameters.
σZ1/β1/β (µ˜−µ) = (1− p)
(
1
βα
− 1
)∫ Z1/β
1/β
(
1
t
)α
α
tα+1
dt+ p
((
1
Z1
)α
−
(
1
Z2
)α)∫ Z1/β
1/β
α
tα+1
dt
=
(1− p)
(
1
βα
− 1
)
β2α
2
[
1−
(
1
Z1
)2α]
+ p
((
1
Z1
)α
−
(
1
Z2
)α)(
βα−
(
β
Z1
)α)
.
Putting them together, we have
σZ2/βZ1 (µ̂−µ)−σZ2/βZ1 (µ˜−µ) =
(
1
Z1
)2α(−(1− p) + pβα
2
)
+ (1− p)
(
1
Z1
)α
−
(
1
Z2
)2α(−(1− p) + pβα
2
)
− (1− p)
(
1
Z2
)α
+ p
(
1
Z2
)2α
− p
(
1
Z1
)α(
1
Z2
)α
.
Lastly, for the analysis, write
g(x, c) =B(c+x)2 + (1− p)(c+x)−Bx2− (1− p)x+ px2− p(c+x)x.
Rearranging the terms, we have
g(x, c) =
[
2Bc+ (1− p)− (1− p)− pc]x= (−1 + pβα)cx.
Thus, g(x, c) is a decreasing function in x. In addition, taking the partial derivative w.r.t. c, we have
∂g(x, c)
∂c
= 2B(c+x) + (1− p)− px= (−(1− p) + pβα)(c+x) + [(1− p)− px].
The sign of ∂g(x,c)
∂c
is actually not clear in this subcase. But for the purpose of finding the minimizer of
σ(µ˜−µ), this is not important because for a fixed value of c, g(x, c) achieves its maximum when x is of the
value such that [Z1,Z2] is of subcase 2, of either case I or case II.
B.3. Computing the optimal range for vouchers
In Figure 22, we demonstrate how the type of range [Z1,Z2] evolves as it moves to the right along the axis
given that ( 1
Z1
)α− ( 1
Z2
)α = ĉ is fixed.
Although the evolution is different depending the value of ĉ, for a fixed value of ĉ, as Z1 gets larger (or
equivalently as Z2 gets larger, or as x := (
1
Z2
)α gets smaller), the range [Z1,Z2] goes from type II to type I.
In particular, for each value of ĉ, such transition happens exactly when βZ2 =Z1. That is, when
ĉ=
(
1
βα
− 1
)(
1
Z2
)α
⇔
(
1
Z2
)α
=
ĉβα
1−βα
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Figure 23 For fixed values of ĉ, the function of σ(µ̂−µ)−σ(µ˜−µ) on Z1
Now, for each fixed value of ĉ, Figure 23 plots σ(µ̂− µ)− σ(µ˜− µ) against Z1. It also shows that as Z1
increases, how the interval [Z1,Z2] changes by cases.
With simple algebra, one can easily check that when ĉ= (1−p)(1−β
α)
2−p−βα−pβα+pβ2α , we have that hI(ĉ) = hII(ĉ) =
ĉβα
1−βα . Therefore,
• When ĉ≥ (1−p)(1−βα)
2−p−βα−pβα+pβ2α , we have hI(ĉ)≤ ĉβ
α
1−βα and hII(ĉ) ≤ ĉβ
α
1−βα . Thus, the maximum of σ(µ̂−µ)−
σ(µ˜−µ) is achieved when x= hI(ĉ).
• When ĉ≤ (1−p)(1−βα)
2−p−βα−pβα+pβ2α , we have hI(ĉ)≥ ĉβ
α
1−βα and hII(ĉ) ≥ ĉβ
α
1−βα . Thus, the maximum of σ(µ̂−µ)−
σ(µ˜−µ) is achieved when x= hII(ĉ).
